



PATHFINDERS

FOR PEACEFUL, JUST AND INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES
HOSTED BY THE CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

GOVERNANCE and **COVID-19**

**A BACKGROUND PAPER FOR
THE 2021 SDG16 CONFERENCE**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The COVID-19 pandemic struck the world at a time when the relationship between governments and their citizens and the relationship between different sections of society were already under pressure. Responses to the 2008 global financial crisis had increased inequality and fueled resentment of elites, and populist leaders had emerged to channel that resentment into increasingly effective assaults on democratic institutions. The world was already off track to deliver the Sustainable Development Goals, even before COVID-19 dramatically worsened the health, educational, and economic plight of billions of people across the globe.

Good governance is critical to putting the world back on course as it aims to rebuild after the crisis. Without trusted and effective governance institutions, the “peaceful, just and inclusive” societies promised by SDG16 will be made ever more elusive by the fallout from the pandemic. SDG16.6 commits to building “effective, accountable and transparent institutions” from the local level to the global. Such institutions are pivotal to tackling poverty, reducing inequality, and providing the effective and inclusive public services demanded by citizens. They are pivotal, too, to developing the transformative long-term policies needed to stabilize the climate, protect the environment, and defend all societies against catastrophic risks such as antimicrobial resistance.

At the same time as it has heightened the need for effective institutions, COVID-19 has made their development more difficult. The pandemic has generated a slew of new demands on institutions, not only in the health sector but also in terms of economic policies, education, policing, and information provision. It has weakened institutions’ ability to respond to these demands by incapacitating staff and closing offices, and by ravaging economies, draining the financial resources needed to meet these new challenges. And it has put pressure on civil society’s ability to mobilize and support the social contract.

Societies face an emergency with three levels – public health, economic, and social. These are unfolding at different speeds, and there is a risk that vicious cycles between them will be triggered, leading to further weakening of public institutions and erosion of trust.

On the other hand, crises such as the pandemic have in the past been fertile ground for drastic governance reforms that have not only helped societies build sustainable recoveries, but also established a new social contract which has reduced inequality and marginalization, delivered new constitutional settlements, and expanded service provision to hitherto neglected groups.

This paper argues that governance is the linchpin both to the response to the pandemic and to achieving the SDGs. It proposes three overarching missions for governance in the coming decade.

A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

In the first section, we ask how the social contract between governments and their citizens can be rebuilt. The social contract is critical to collective efforts to rebound from disasters and build societies’ resilience against future risks. Institutions that promote widespread participation in such efforts and confront the abuses that increase distrust and weaken collective action will be important to tackling the complex challenges

faced by 21st century societies and deliver the public goods needed to sustain economic and social development. A renewed social contract can give governments the political backing to make difficult decisions in the wake of the pandemic and help to avert conflicts within and between societies that might otherwise imperil recovery.

Action in three areas in particular is needed. First, investment is needed in social protection systems. Social and economic inclusion are fundamental to a social contract that encompasses all members of a society. They give people a platform for political participation and for claiming their rights and are crucial to fulfilling the 2030 Agenda's pledge to leave no one behind. Even in wealthy countries, the pandemic has left many people unable to make ends meet and reliant on government support packages to pay for basic needs. In poorer countries, large majorities of people have no access to government support.

Most countries have put in place additional social protection measures during the pandemic, in many cases providing healthcare or economic support to previously marginalized groups. Cementing these measures over the longer term will be key to enhancing resilience to future shocks, reducing inequality and exclusion, and enlisting all sections of society in the rebuilding effort.

Second, more space can be created for dialogue and participation in governance. SDG16.7 pledges to “ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.” Inclusive engagement of all sections of society is vital to the social contract, enabling people to express their needs and expectations, eject governments that fail to meet those needs, and support the provision of public services.

In many countries, citizen participation has been reduced in recent years, either by governments limiting their involvement or due to increasing public apathy as trust in electoral institutions and politicians has waned. On the other hand – and particularly during the pandemic – citizens have found new ways to influence decision-making and to participate in the delivery of services to marginalized population groups. In rebuilding after the crisis, governments have an opportunity to institutionalize models that facilitate increased participation, allowing people to play a part in decision-making and channeling discontent towards productive purposes.

Third, governments wishing to strengthen the social contract would benefit from tackling the drivers of mistrust in public institutions. Corruption and other state abuses widen inequality and fuel grievances, thereby increasing the risks of violence and conflict that can nullify or reverse progress in other areas. The pandemic has created new risks of corruption regarding healthcare supplies and economic support packages, and if citizens see that institutions' efforts to tackle the pandemic are being abused by elites, repairing the social contract will be impossible.

A two-pronged approach to tackling corruption that involves both bottom-up and top-down action has proven effective in a number of contexts. Crises can provide opportunities for breakthroughs against corruption and other abuses by state actors, with new technologies offering potential to strengthen crucial transparency and accountability mechanisms.

SOLVING PROBLEMS THAT MATTER

In the second section of the paper, we explore how governments can improve the performance of institutions so that they can solve the problems that matter to people

during and after the pandemic. More effective delivery will help narrow the gap between governments and citizens and reduce the grievances and exclusion that can lead to conflict. Balancing health and economic priorities has proved difficult for most governments, with those countries that have favored measures to open economies despite the risks to health generally seeing sharp declines in both health and economic indicators.

We look at three aspects of the delivery challenge. First, we assess how decisions have been taken during the pandemic and how this process can be improved. Governments were ill-prepared to deal with the health impacts of the virus, and they have little research on which to draw when developing economic responses. This renders decision-making more difficult, particularly in a rapidly changing environment where decisions must be made in haste.

Improved decision-making requires consideration of a wide range of evidence – not only evidence that fits decision-makers' preconceptions – including consultation with groups directly affected by the virus and its economic fallout. Transparency over who is involved in decisions, what advice is used, and how policy choices are eventually arrived at can increase public trust and enable greater clarity when communicating complex messages. Admitting uncertainty and being open about trade-offs that have to be made are important facets of effective communication during a crisis, while efforts to build consensus around possible solutions are more likely to promote effective implementation of decisions.

Second, we discuss how governance arrangements are working to reduce or increase inequalities during the pandemic. During the first year of the crisis, less affluent population groups were hardest hit by both its health and economic effects. This has led to increased resentment in many societies and in some cases to violent protests as virus prevention measures and the distribution of rescue packages have been seen to favor the privileged.

Sharing the burden of the response to the disease will speed the recovery and strengthen resilience to future threats. More people-centered governance of health systems can reduce health inequalities, while efforts to promote equitable access to and quality of education can help redress the balance in the wake of the worldwide shock of school closures and their disproportionate impact on poorer and more marginalized students. For both healthcare and education to become more equitable, moreover, efforts to promote digital inclusion and equity will be important.

Third, we ask if the pandemic can spur governments to develop new governance arrangements and act as a platform for tackling complex challenges, facilitating rather than taking sole responsibility for sustainable and resilient development while continuing to ensure accountability and promote trust.

Acting as a platform requires public services to become more people-centered, focusing on what matters most to people and adapting or creating services that respond to people's expressed needs and preferences. People-centered governments involve citizens in designing, delivering, and monitoring public services, and involve multiple sectors in meeting people's needs. They develop new partnerships, enlisting support from both within different branches and layers of government and from the private and third sectors to tackle complex challenges that cannot be addressed by central governments alone.

As discussed above, digital technologies can facilitate people-centered approaches. Public sector bodies have digitalized services in response to the pandemic, and private and third-sector organizations can help develop technologies that respond to people's needs without widening digital divides.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL ACTION

The paper concludes with a global perspective, discussing how international collective action and strengthened global and regional governance can help increase the effectiveness of institutions at national and subnational levels.

The pandemic has placed global and national institutions under great strain and weakened many countries' commitment to the international system. While the international scientific community has made enormous strides in generating knowledge of the virus and developing treatments and vaccines, squabbles over vaccine distribution and over debt forgiveness to countries struggling to cope have exposed fault lines in global governance and heightened stresses both within and between countries.

There is strong public support for enhanced international cooperation, both during and after the pandemic. Global collective action can assist national governance by helping to renew the social contract and supporting governments to deliver on their policies.

To renew the social contract, international actors can advocate for, design, and help finance increased social protection. They can help tackle inequality, for example by ensuring equitable distribution of vaccines worldwide, promoting universal healthcare coverage, and facilitating educational improvements. They can support political inclusion by protecting and funding civil society organizations and a free and independent media. They can reduce corruption by developing and enforcing global rules for multinational corporations. And they can tackle the disinformation that undermines trust in governments and in other institutions – and which is a cross-border phenomenon – including by working with multi-national technology companies to develop safeguards and address abuses.

International cooperation can also support the social contract by addressing the abuses that weaken it. Transnational corruption weakens governments' ability to deliver while reducing citizens' trust in national and global institutions. Corruption during the pandemic – for example, in terms of economic recovery packages – often has a transnational dimension and risks sharply accelerating the decline in trust. Action by the OECD, the Open Government Partnership, and others has already begun to deliver progress in this area.

Global collective action can support governments to deliver on their policies by investing in global public goods. As they recover from the pandemic, governments can benefit from new international partnerships, perhaps based on successful collaborations during the pandemic such as the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator and the COVAX initiative that is part of it. They can take advantage of new financing models such as those developed by the IMF, the EU, the G20, and others to tackle the debt crisis facing many countries in the wake of the virus.

Global action can also support national delivery by protecting countries against future shocks. COVID-19 has demonstrated how vulnerable countries are to transnational risks. Future pandemics, the impacts of climate change, violent conflicts, and cyberattacks are also unlikely to respect national borders and, like COVID-19, will not be overcome without international cooperation.

The global public health community has shown in the past year how collective action can reduce the impact of crises and build resilience against them. As we attempt to 'build back better' from the pandemic, collective international action that supports effective, transparent, and inclusive national governance will be more important than ever.

INTRODUCTION

GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has created new risks and challenges for societies and exacerbated existing ones. The emergency will shape the 2020s, and as citizens turn to public institutions for support, the latter's response will determine not only how quickly countries recover from the health and economic impacts of the virus, but the nature of the relationship between governments and their people. Good governance will be critical to establishing a trusting bidirectional relationship that can assist societies to rebuild. Bad governance, on the other hand, risks imperiling the entire social contract.

AN AGE OF DISQUIET AND DISCONTENT

As the world entered the 2020s, the UN Secretary-General warned the General Assembly of the dangers of deep and growing mistrust within societies. “Disquiet and discontent are churning societies from north to south,” he said, as institutions fail to deliver, establishment politicians are discredited, and fear and hatred spread. Launching a Decade of Action to deliver the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, he called for unstinting efforts to rebuild public trust to be at the heart of delivering the SDGs.

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic hit, the world was far off track to deliver the SDGs. According to the 2020 progress report:¹

- Six percent of the world's population are projected still to be living in extreme poverty by 2030, and food insecurity is on the rise.
- Targets will not be met to provide universal access to healthcare, quality education, social protection, water and sanitation, modern energy, and other essential services.
- Global economic growth had slowed well before public health restrictions were imposed, while inequality had reached critical levels as the rich benefited disproportionately from growth.
- Climate stabilization remained a distant goal, and global warming was already “bringing with it massive wildfires, hurricanes, droughts, floods and other climate disasters across continents.”
- Biodiversity continues to decline, with land degradation threatening 3.2 billion people, forests continuing to shrink, and dangerously rapid degradation of oceans.

None of these problems can be solved without good governance or the fulfilment of the commitment in SDG16.6 to build “effective, accountable and transparent institutions” at levels from the local to the global.² Institutions are fundamental drivers of development, determining success or failure in tackling poverty, reducing inequality, and sharing prosperity.³ Many of the obstacles to delivering quality healthcare, education, and other public services are rooted in poor governance. New types of institution are needed to implement the long-term policies required to stabilize the climate, protect the environment, and provide a range of critical public goods.⁴

Governance and institutions are also fundamental to building the peaceful, just and inclusive societies promised by SDG16. Political institutions determine the balance of power and can help societies manage disputes in a constructive fashion.⁵ Justice is a core responsibility of the state, while failures of and abuses by justice institutions are potent drivers of exclusion and insecurity.⁶ More broadly, governance matters to peace.⁷ Dysfunctional and discriminatory institutions can fuel the grievances that lead to violence and conflict.⁸ Insecurity, in turn, makes it harder for societies to build the institutions they need in order to develop sustainably.

Without more effective and inclusive governance across all dimensions of the 2030 Agenda, its transformational vision will remain out of reach.

GOVERNANCE AND COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has made the need for good governance more urgent, acting as a stress test for institutions from the local to the global level. It has created extraordinary new demands on governments, eroded their capacity to meet these demands, and heightened risks of corruption that could challenge their legitimacy over the long term.

Societies face an emergency with three levels (see graphic), each of which is unfolding simultaneously but at different speeds:⁹

- The **public health emergency** will likely take two or more years to resolve, with the success of any 'exit strategy' reliant on the effectiveness and legitimacy of institutions as they implement testing and contact tracing programs, restrict the movement of their citizens, treat people who are infected, and roll out vaccines.
- The **economic crisis** could take a decade fully to unfold, with governments spending unprecedented amounts to support their economies in the short term.¹⁰ A longer-term recovery will require substantially increased public investment, but fiscal space will be limited in many countries by soaring levels of sovereign debt.¹¹
- The **political, social, and security impacts** of the pandemic may be felt over a generation. The pandemic response and recovery have the potential to pull people together, but could also create division if a failure of institutions fuels popular grievances and creates the conditions for further polarization and insecurity.¹²

At each of these levels, effective, accountable, and transparent institutions are badly needed. Governments are designing and implementing new processes, policies, and programs at speed, often with few checks and balances and with a lack of consultation and oversight. At the same time, public sector organizations have been forced to make a sudden shift to virtual working and some have experienced high levels of infections among their workforces.¹³ Taxation revenues have plummeted and governments have limited insights into how quickly they will recover.¹⁴ Many governments already face financial pressures or will do so soon, especially in countries that lack ready

1-2 years
Public health
crisis

5-10 years
Economic,
employment,
and financial
crisis

A generation
or longer
Polarisation and
insecurity

access to international credit markets.¹⁵ The ability of civil society, meanwhile, to serve as a stabilizing factor by supporting those most in need has been weakened in many settings in recent decades.

In the worst case, societies face a vicious cycle where crises multiply, public institutions lose capacity and are starved of finance, and governance failures lead to further erosion of trust. In such a scenario, the basis for collective action would be undermined both within and between countries, making it progressively harder to tackle current and future challenges and potentially risking violent unrest.

A more positive scenario is, of course, possible. Systemic crises are fertile ground for governance innovation, with the potential to lead to new constitutional settlements, marked reductions in inequality, shifts in the balance of political power, and effective efforts to rebuild the social contract.¹⁶ In the period after World War II, for example, relations between governments, employers, and unions underwent significant change in the United States, Japan, and many Western European countries.¹⁷ While each country took its own path, the resulting increase in social collaboration supported a period of growing prosperity and relatively high levels of political stability. This was a period of social and economic transformation, leading to the birth of new institutions and to a reimagining of the mandate of existing ones.


The COVID-19 pandemic could also stimulate renewal. A study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the University of Denver has shown that, in the worst case, the pandemic could drive an additional 251 million people into poverty.¹⁸ However, an 'SDG Push' scenario, characterized by increased investment in governance, social protection, the green economy, and digitalization, could cut the number of people living in extreme poverty by 146 million compared to the study's COVID-19 baseline scenario, with more than half being women and girls.¹⁹ The majority of the impact would be in fragile and conflict-affected states where institutions are currently weakest.

A central question therefore for this paper is whether societies have the institutional capacity and creativity needed to 'build back better' and to deliver the 2030 Agenda, at least in part,²⁰ or whether the 2020s will be a period of retrenchment in the face of a deepening crisis, with economic, social, and environmental targets left unmet.

A CRISIS OF TRUST

Pressure on institutions to deliver comes at a time when they are often viewed with suspicion by the public. According to the Edelman Trust Barometer, government is much less trusted than business (which is seen as more effective than government) and also than non-governmental organizations (which are seen as more ethical – see figure 1).²¹

This paper is grounded in three assumptions about trust. First, that both effectiveness and ethics are important drivers of trust in governments. Delivery matters – survey and experimental data suggest that



governments earn *positive* feelings of trust when institutions perform well²² and when people are satisfied with the quality of public services they receive. A survey in six countries, for example, found that, “overall satisfaction with public services, and most particularly satisfaction with education, health care, childcare, welfare systems and perceived security strongly correlate with trust in institutions.”²³

But a government’s ethics – and in particular perceptions of the integrity of politicians – are even more powerful determinants of *negative* feelings of *mistrust*.²⁵ Mass protests are only infrequently triggered by the failure of public services, but people will come out onto the streets when government policies are perceived to be unfair and politicians are seen as corrupt. The 2010s began with a wave of public mobilization in the Arab world.²⁶ The decade ended as people again took to the streets to protest against “inequality, corruption and bad governance” in a diverse range of countries.²⁷

Second, it is rational to distrust institutions when they demonstrate that they are untrustworthy.²⁸ The TrustGov project has proposed a typology comparing people’s levels of trust or mistrust with objective measures of the quality of governance. *Skeptical trust* or *skeptical mistrust* are contrasted with *compliant trust*, where people are more trusting of their governments than would be expected from the quality of governance, and *cynical mistrust*, when trust judgements appear to be disproportionately negative. Skeptics are perhaps in the best position to promote accountability. In contrast, while “deep cynicism can be dysfunctional for society and for democracy, equally there are dangers arising at the opposite extreme among credulous citizens who support dishonest, incompetent, and corrupt leaders blindly irrespective of their performance in serving the public interest.”²⁹

Third, the 2030 Agenda places the onus on governments and institutions to trust people. Leaders underline their commitment to “common action and endeavor” to deliver the Sustainable Development Goals,³⁰ and explicitly promise to invite all sectors of society and “all people” into the Agenda’s implementation. But there is little evidence that governments have faith in their people’s capabilities. Levels of public sector trust in citizens are low and may be declining, as many governments use increasingly sophisticated tools to monitor their citizens and shift the ‘burden of proof’ onto the public in areas such as eligibility for social assistance or responsibility for paying taxes.³¹

As well as giving the lie to governments’ 2030 Agenda pledges, this undermines the reciprocal nature of trust, where “perception that a government is untrustworthy is a function not only of its failure to fulfill promises but also of evidence that government agents distrust those from whom they are demanding cooperation and compliance.”³²

KEEPING THE WHEELS ON

The need for trustworthy institutions has come into sharp relief during the pandemic. In some contexts, government responses to the pandemic have increased trust, at least in the short term.³³ Publics became highly reliant on institutions to support them during the crisis, while governments were also motivated to place their trust in citizens to comply with emergency regulations. As a result, trust became “a two-way street in health emergencies, for both citizens and public authorities.”³⁴

The pandemic also forced multiple levels of government to work together, with subnational authorities playing an essential role.³⁵ Participation from outside

government, moreover, was essential, with community and grassroots mobilization demonstrating how active participation at a local level can contribute to strengthening the cohesion and resilience of societies.³⁶

But the pandemic also exposed and aggravated existing weaknesses in the relationship between people and their institutions.³⁷ Public distrust of governments *and* government distrust of publics have made it harder to maintain consensus behind public health restrictions.³⁸ Some countries experienced an increasingly polarized response, with divisions emerging over whether to limit economic activity in the short-term in order to reduce the spread of infection.³⁹ Such polarization could undermine the social contract over the long-term,⁴⁰ with the director-general of the World Health Organization warning that “when we are divided, the virus exploits the cracks between us.”⁴¹ The 1918 flu pandemic, for example, led to lifelong losses of trust in institutions.⁴²

The central argument of this paper is that governance is the linchpin of both the COVID-19 response and of all dimensions of the 2030 Agenda. Many SDG targets have a valid claim to having a cross-cutting impact on the Agenda as a whole, but ‘linchpin’ – a word from the Middle Ages for the pin that keeps a wheel from falling off its axis – is an apposite description of the role that effective, transparent, and accountable institutions play in delivering shared goals for people, prosperity, planet, and peace. Governance becomes even more important to ‘keeping the wheels on’ during an emergency and in its aftermath, when people need institutions to deliver in the short-term but also to give them confidence that they are capable of managing longer term challenges.

By shining the spotlight on governance, we encourage a shift in focus from *what* we want governments to achieve to *how* they can both deliver these results and do so in a way that enhances the legitimacy they need in order to operate. The paper proposes three overarching missions for governance in the 2020s, each of which is explored through examples.

In the first section, we explore the challenge of rebuilding the social contract between citizens and their societies, with institutions playing a critical role in enabling and promoting participation and in confronting the abuses that drive distrust. The focus of this section is on fundamental questions of how to promote inclusion in all its forms – social, political, and economic – and how to limit institutional behaviors that undermine government legitimacy and encourage exclusion.

In the second section, we turn to the question of how governments can improve their capacity to solve the problems that matter most to people during the pandemic. This section focuses on three governance challenges: managing tensions between the public health restrictions needed to reduce COVID-19 infections and the policies needed to support economies and livelihoods; addressing distributional questions so that inequality and exclusion are not increased by the pandemic; and positioning government as a platform for delivery in tackling future challenges.

The paper concludes with a global perspective. How can international collective action and strengthened global and regional governance help increase the effectiveness of institutions at national and subnational levels? And what role can the SDG targets for governance and institutions play in helping countries work together to mount an effective COVID-19 response and recovery?

SPOTLIGHT

WHY DOES SDG16 MATTER?

The 2030 Agenda has a goal for peaceful, just and inclusive societies – SDG16, with 12 targets. But the agenda includes targets for promoting peace, justice, and inclusion in other Sustainable Development Goals. This has been called SDG16+.

SDG16+ includes four interrelated challenges – each of which are of critical to the future of countries, communities, and people.⁴³

SDG16'S GRAND CHALLENGES

While violence is projected to increase by 2030, we have the evidence and tools to achieve quantified and accelerating reductions.⁴⁴ Violence is preventable and could be halved by 2030.⁴⁵ The Movement to Halve Global Violence by 2030 has emphasized the important of understanding the nature, distribution, and drivers of violence, and of developing an evidence-base of 'what works' to tackle them.⁴⁶

SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING ALL FORMS OF VIOLENCE EVERYWHERE

Before the pandemic, 1.5 billion people had justice problems that they were unable to resolve.⁴⁷ The Task Force on Justice has proposed an agenda for preventing and solving justice problems, and for using justice systems to create opportunities for people to participate in their societies and economies.⁴⁸

PROVIDING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ALL

TACKLING INEQUALITY AND EXCLUSION

COVID-19 has exposed but exacerbated deep-seated inequalities and systems of exclusion around the world.⁴⁹ In response, a group of world leaders have come together to "identify practical and politically viable solutions to the challenge of inequality and exclusion in our own societies and globally."⁵⁰

TRANSFORMING INSTITUTIONS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT MATTER MOST FOR PEOPLE

Strengthening governance and equipping institutions to deliver the 2030 Agenda's aspirations for people, planet, prosperity, and peace.

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THIS REPORT FOCUSES ON TRANSFORMING INSTITUTIONS – THE FOURTH OF THE GRAND CHALLENGES – BUT GOVERNANCE IS ALSO LINKED TO EACH OF THE THREE OTHER GRAND CHALLENGES:

1. Violence is fueled by weak governance and can be tackled by making both institutions and decision-making more inclusive.⁵¹ Institutions also play a direct role in preventing violence and mediating disputes peacefully.
2. More responsive and inclusive institutions are needed to deliver people-centered justice, with new governance models helping formal and informal, and state and non-state justice actors work together to provide justice for all.
3. As this report highlights, public trust feeds the legitimacy of institutions, while participation contributes to their effectiveness. Inequality matters for the quality of governance, while institutions play an important role in tackling inequalities of wealth and power.⁵²

ONE

A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

Strengthening the social contract between governments and citizens is critical for addressing both the COVID-19 pandemic and future challenges and crises. Some societies – although not all – have responded to the pandemic by expanding social protection schemes, increasing dialogue between institutions and citizens, and working to rebuild trust. Whether these measures contribute to a strengthened social contract over the longer term will depend on whether they are made permanent or seen as temporary stopgaps.

In the 2020 Nelson Mandela Lecture, the UN Secretary-General called for a new social contract to “enable young people to live in dignity... ensure women have the same prospects and opportunities as men... and protect the sick, the vulnerable, and minorities of all kinds.”⁵³ The COVID pandemic, he said, was an opportunity to build more sustainable and inclusive societies that “can address inequality and the fragilities of our present world.”

UNDP defines the social contract as an agreement through which “everyone in a political community, either explicitly or tacitly, consents to state authority,” as people “comply with the state’s laws, rules, and practices in pursuit of broader common goals.”⁵⁴ This agreement is maintained through processes of governance which allow “citizens and groups [to] articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, and mediate their differences.”⁵⁵ A social contract needs active support from both state and citizens, in line with SDG16.7’s commitment to “responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.”⁵⁶

Through this lens, good governance and a robust social contract provide the foundation for inclusion and sustainability. It allows a society to support the levels of collective action that are needed to tackle complex challenges and deliver public goods, and to mediate and resolve conflicts peacefully and productively.

Conversely, weak and illegitimate institutions erode the ‘immune system’ that societies need to cope with internal and external stresses.⁵⁷ The breakdown of the social contract between state and citizens is exacerbated by grievances that develop when groups that feel excluded from access to power, public services, and security, creating threats to both peace and development.⁵⁸

At the national level, the pandemic has highlighted the fundamental role played by the social contract. As a complex and protracted emergency, it has stressed all sections of society, while causing disproportionate health and economic impacts for already disadvantaged groups. Politicians have been forced to make decisions rapidly and under conditions of considerable uncertainty. Public health restrictions have led to unprecedented restrictions on freedom of movement and association which have required the compliance of all sections of society.

This has underlined the urgency of early and proactive efforts to strengthen the social contract – and to reimagine it for current and future challenges. A reimagined social contract will underpin efforts to end the pandemic, increasing support for mass vaccination campaigns, for example.⁵⁹ In the longer-term, it can provide governments with political backing as they make difficult decisions about restricting and rebuilding

economies.⁶⁰ And it may also forestall the instability and insecurity that has the potential to dramatically worsen the crisis in countries, regions, or even globally.⁶¹

In exploring the steps that societies have taken towards a new social contract, we focus on three dimensions: investing in universal social protection systems as an enabler of social and economic inclusion in the social contract; creating space for dialogue and participation; and tackling drivers of mistrust in public institutions.

These dimensions are not intended to be comprehensive, but illustrative of the range of different approaches that will be needed to make social contracts more equitable, inclusive, and resilient in the face of current and future challenges. They are also interrelated with questions of government performance and delivery which are tackled in the next section.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION

A central principle of the 2030 Agenda is to leave no-one behind.⁶² In committing to the Agenda, countries committed to endeavoring to reach the furthest behind first and to promoting “the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status.”

Social and economic inclusion are the starting point for a social contract, providing the basis for political participation in society and giving all peoples opportunities for meaningful action as they seek to exercise their rights and protect their interests. Political inclusion, in turn, is necessary to challenge structural barriers that perpetuate other forms of exclusion, with significant reductions in inequality often resting on a political mobilization that both pressures and enables governments to act.⁶³

Social protection systems defend people against poverty, but they also defend both people and societies against risk.⁶⁴ As Amartya Sen argued in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, the extent to which ‘protective security’ is shared becomes critical when an emergency hits, “as people’s predicaments diverge and some groups are thrown brutally to the wall while other groups experience little adversity.”⁶⁵ When safety nets are lacking, social cohesion is threatened at the moment when it is most needed, exacerbating impacts on vulnerable groups while also reducing incentives for political leaders to mount a robust response.

The health and economic fallout from a pandemic exacerbates deep-seated perceptions of insecurity. Even in OECD countries, where social safety nets are relatively well-developed, falling ill and being unable to make ends meet are the risks that matter most to people.⁶⁶ Overwhelming majorities in these countries are also highly skeptical about their government’s ability to provide them with safety nets that protect them from these risks. They feel that social security systems are unfair and that governments fail to listen to them when designing benefit systems.

In many poorer countries, a large majority of the population has very little protection from social or economic risk in ‘normal’ times. In 2015, for example, more than 900 million people incurred catastrophic health spending (defined as half of their household budget), with more than 200 million spending over a quarter of

their budget on it.⁶⁷ When a broader health emergency strikes, risks spread from the household to the community or society level.

Past emergencies have brought the dynamic nature of the social contract into sharp relief. The East Asian crisis of 1997 exposed the fragility of a model where the state focused on delivering economic growth while social protection was provided by families and informal networks.⁶⁸ In response to the crisis, the region's governments rebuilt the social contract by investing heavily in social protection systems, although groups such as informal workers remain largely excluded.⁶⁹ These policies were influential at a global level, as both governments and international organizations accepted "the urgency of finding new means of protecting populations from adverse events."⁷⁰

In contrast, the 2008 financial crisis triggered only a short-term stimulus. After a period in which investment in social protection systems effectively mitigated the impacts of the crisis, a "decade of austerity" saw 127 countries – home to 80 percent of the world's population – cut public expenditure.⁷¹ More than a hundred countries aimed to rationalize their social protection systems in ways that ran "a high risk of excluding large segments of vulnerable populations at a time of economic crisis and hardship."⁷² Social and economic exclusion, in turn, undermined political consensus. According to a multi-country study, austerity's impact on the social contract had a pronounced impact on polarization, making it harder to "build stable government coalitions and agree on sustainable policy solutions, both of which are needed to govern in times of economic insecurity."⁷³

The disproportionate distribution of impacts is one of the most striking features of the COVID-19 pandemic, with many countries lacking the social protection systems needed to mitigate vulnerabilities. In 2019, 55 percent of the world's population were unprotected by a single social protection benefit and 72 percent were not protected by a full range of benefits.⁷⁴ People with secure employment and access to safety nets have been better able to socially isolate and to work remotely.⁷⁵ Communities with more crowded housing, lower incomes, and higher proportions of residents from minority groups have tended to become infection hotspots.⁷⁶ Ethnic minorities and other excluded groups have faced disproportionate health risks and young people and women are bearing the brunt of the economic impacts,⁷⁷ with women less likely than men to have access to safety nets such as unemployment insurance.⁷⁸

Many countries have implemented emergency interventions to tackle these deficits. According to the World Bank, more than 200 countries and territories had put in place over 1,000 social protection measures by September 2020, with an average expenditure of \$243 per capita, which is well above levels seen during the 2008 financial crisis.⁸⁰ Social assistance such as cash or in-kind transfers or waiving utility fees made up 61 percent of the total; social insurance programs such as unemployment benefits or paid sick leave made up 24 percent; and

In Bulgaria, informal sector workers have been offered interest-free loans up to US\$830, with a grace period of five years and a repayment period of ten. Bulgarians whose income is below the national poverty line during the emergency also receive food vouchers.⁷⁹

labor market interventions such as wage subsidies, 14 percent. Poorer countries relied almost entirely on social assistance models – cash transfer programs alone were scaled up to reach 1.3 billion people, or 17 percent of the world’s population.

This wave of social protection measures has had two interrelated implications for the social contract. First, it has led to significant increases in coverage for some excluded groups. Some countries have extended access to healthcare, provided income support for informal sector workers, or extended coverage to migrants or people without legal identity.⁸¹ In part, more inclusive policies reflect the widespread threat from the pandemic. But governments were also pragmatic, favoring universal approaches when it seemed impossible to design and implement more narrowly targeted programs at speed, or to tightly monitor conditional transfers.

Second, it has created space for longer-term use of social protection measures to tackle inequality, boosting awareness of increasingly compelling evidence that social protection can reduce economic, social, and political exclusion.⁸³ Unconditional transfers may have been favored because they can be provided rapidly and are relatively easy to administer, but there is also evidence of the positive impacts of such transfers.⁸⁴ Some countries are implementing blended programs that provide universal support for the most vulnerable households, combined with elements that increase incentives to invest in education or health.⁸⁵ Others have begun to explore more challenging approaches, such as a Universal Basic Income, with experimental programs launched in a number of countries.⁸⁶

A new generation of social protection systems requires effective and innovative governance. During the pandemic, the countries that were able to scale up most quickly had already invested in robust identification and delivery systems.⁸⁸ Other countries were forced to find new ways of reaching people, for example by using mobile phone data. The latter now face the challenge of institutionalizing these approaches, mandating existing or new organizations to set up and run inclusive and transparent registries and identification systems, for example, or to process and make digital payments.⁸⁹

In the best case, this innovation will create an institutional architecture that can respond to current need and adapt to future challenges, turning “ad hoc, fragmented and disorganized ‘islands’ of social protection programming [into] efficient, targeted and multi-faceted systems that can tackle the complexity of poverty.”⁹⁰ The social contract will be further strengthened if this integration process is a participatory one. Some countries have used dialogue mechanisms to shape how social protection systems respond to the pandemic, providing an opportunity for longer-term participation of citizens, workers, and employers.⁹¹

Early in the pandemic, Portugal granted temporary citizenship rights to all migrants and asylum seekers, thereby reducing the risk of untreated infections, rendering community outbreaks less likely, and protecting migrants from rights abuses.⁸²

Togo’s NOVISSI cash transfer program provides monthly financial aid to informal sector workers whose income has been reduced by the COVID-19 pandemic. Funds are provided by the government and a Give Directly online crowdfunding campaign. By November 2020, the program had reached 580,000 beneficiaries.⁸⁷

Soon after COVID-19 restrictions were implemented in India, digital payment systems were used to deliver cash transfers to 300 million account holders in the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana financial inclusion program.⁹²

At present, however, the majority of social protection measures implemented are temporary.⁹³ As in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, countries face challenges regarding financial sustainability, with a financing gap of \$1.2 billion in 2020 for providing universal social protection coverage, or 3.8 percent of developing-country GDP.⁹⁴ Following the precedent of the East Asian crisis, the pandemic may mark the acceleration of the push towards universal protection through the lifecycle, as countries institutionalize temporary measures, continue to expand coverage to excluded groups, and mainstream participatory mechanisms for program design and accountability.

Alternatively, many governments may limit their efforts to providing minimalist 'safety nets' and stopgap measures during a period of fiscal retrenchment, leaving large gaps in protection which would undermine the social contract and reduce resilience to a future wave of the crisis.

POLITICAL INCLUSION: SPACE FOR DIALOGUE AND PARTICIPATION

SDG16.7 makes a promise to “ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.”⁹⁵ The 2030 Agenda also emphasizes the importance of political participation for women and girls, and identifies young people as “critical agents of change” who should use the 2030 Agenda to “channel their infinite capacities for activism into the creation of a better world.”

Inclusive citizen engagement plays an essential role in maintaining the social contract, through individual actions such as voting and through the role that groups of people can play in demanding improvements to public services by taking part in organized social dialogue or consultations with their governments.⁹⁶ According to the World Bank, engagement in the political process is the key to improving governance when it strengthens incentives for leaders to provide critical public goods, but has a negative impact when it promotes patronage and increases polarization.⁹⁷ In turn, more inclusive institutions, in which large numbers of citizens of diverse backgrounds participate, promote norms that underpin collective action. Positive patterns of political participation and engagement appear to play an important role in promoting economic growth over the long-term.⁹⁸ Inclusive politics may make democracies more resilient to shocks and their impact on reducing long-term economic performance.⁹⁹

However, despite the 2030 Agenda's commitment to political participation, the period since its adoption has seen a trend towards less inclusive politics.¹⁰⁰ The social contract has been undermined by declining faith in electoral institutions.¹⁰¹ Voter turnout was stable throughout the mid-twentieth century but then declined significantly. Globally, around three quarters of people voted in the 1980s, but this fell to 66 percent in 2011-2015.¹⁰² In OECD countries and in large middle-income countries, a quarter of young people say they are not interested in politics at all.¹⁰³ The strength of organized civil society in the form of trade unions and other professional bodies has declined in many countries, while a 14-country study found low levels of political engagement beyond voting, especially among young people (the study revealed that poor healthcare, poor quality schools, and poverty were identified as the reasons most likely to motivate people to take political action such as contacting a politician or taking part in a demonstration).¹⁰⁴

Women face especially high barriers to inclusion. Historically, they were less likely to vote than men in European countries, but this gender gap has largely disappeared.¹⁰⁵ However, less than a quarter of the world's parliamentarians are women.¹⁰⁶ This imbalance has broader impacts on women's political exclusion, with young women less likely to debate politics or want to participate in politics when fewer of their political role models are women.¹⁰⁷ Women are least likely to participate in politics when human rights are abused, when they face discrimination when they engage in politics, when they face violent intimidation or are targeted by electoral violence, or when the general quality of governance is low.¹⁰⁸

The pandemic hit at a time when opportunities for political inclusion were being reduced. According to the UN Secretary-General, "in many places around the world, participation is being denied and civic space is being crushed."¹⁰⁹ A recent survey of experts finds that basic freedoms are under attack, with "government assaults on civil society, freedom of expression, and the media... proliferating and becoming more severe."¹¹⁰ The survey finds that in many countries, the right to peaceful assembly and protest has been curtailed.¹¹¹ The quality of elections has declined in some countries, usually after a period in which media freedom, civil society space, and other 'watchdog' functions have been systematically attacked.¹¹² Organized civil society has also been weakened in many countries in recent decades, with fewer people organizing in trade unions, professional associations, and other types of civic organizations.

A decline in traditional models of political engagement has been accompanied by increasing use of alternative pathways for citizen engagement. Citizens have found new ways to influence decision-making, through greater use of deliberative models such as citizen councils, youth parliaments, and other forms of 'deep democracy'. The use of such techniques has increased in the past decade,¹¹³ and public sector bodies that have tried them once have been found to be likely to continue to use them.¹¹⁴ This new wave of deliberative democracy has emerged as a response to declining levels of trust and rising levels of polarization, especially in areas where there is a need to develop consensus on how to tackle complex and long-term challenges.¹¹⁵

During the pandemic, public health decision-making has tended to be highly centralized, despite evidence of the positive role citizen participation has played in past health crises. But some countries have provided space for citizen participation by encouraging non-governmental stakeholders to propose and implement solutions,¹¹⁶ while others have used citizens' panels and other social dialogue mechanisms to inform and reach consensus over the economic response to the virus.¹¹⁷ The question now is to the extent to which societies will institutionalize opportunities for citizens to identify longer-term priorities and to influence the design and development of policies that aim to secure a sustainable recovery.¹¹⁸

In Kenya, the senate committee responsible for overseeing the COVID-19 response invited public submissions on how the pandemic is affecting them and how they thought the response should be managed. The submissions were considered while drafting a pandemic response and management bill.¹¹⁹

The 'Decide Madrid' citizen participation web portal allows for citizens to propose and vote for new laws, to participate in budgeting, and to be consulted on new policies. During the pandemic, the portal – which has now been adopted by 130 cities worldwide – has been used to encourage citizens to propose solutions and to provide information on essential services.¹²⁰

People have also participated directly in the policymaking process. Participatory budgeting has allowed citizens to shape how governments set budgets and monitor their execution.¹²¹ Citizens, businesses, and NGOs have engaged in co-creating public services and in monitoring their implementation via score cards and social audits.¹²² New approaches to transparency and accountability allow for direct interaction between users and service providers and use measures such as freedom of information legislation to increase citizen oversight.¹²³

The pandemic has made this type of engagement more visible. In many countries, citizens have been at the forefront of the response to the pandemic. Around the world there has been massive mobilization at the grassroots level to tackle COVID-19. From campaigns to disseminate hand sanitizers, masks, and information on health and rights in informal settlements,¹²⁴ to community kitchens which have distributed millions of meals to the most vulnerable during lockdowns,¹²⁵ much of the response in the least affluent communities has been led by civilians, often but not always with support from governments. In some countries, increasing digitization of participation has seen citizens participating in COVID-19 policymaking via WhatsApp and Facebook question and answer sessions, and assisting with virtual mapping of outbreaks and food insecurity hotspots.¹²⁶

There are also opportunities for participation outside the system. Non-violent protests have become more common over time and are more likely to achieve their aims than campaigns of non-state violence.¹²⁸ They have lower barriers to entry for ordinary citizens and are most likely to succeed when they “recruit a robust, diverse, and broad-based membership.”¹²⁹ They also have a better track record in building and sustaining effective and accountable institutions. Levels of mass mobilization were at an elevated level ahead of the pandemic.¹³⁰ However, as restrictions on movement and association were imposed, all regions saw a decline in peaceful protests.¹³¹ Policies such as emergency powers, curbs on media freedom, and bans on political campaigning have closed the space for participation, although these have not led to better public health outcomes.¹³²

There have been signs, however, of civic resilience – the Black Lives Matter protests in the United States, the ENDSARS protests against police brutality in Nigeria, and anti-lockdown protests in countries including Italy and Hungary are examples of people continuing to mobilize even during a pandemic.¹³³ COVID-19 may also be triggering a tactical diversification – for example, through the greater use of digital protests – and shifts in strategy as movements use the pandemic as “an opportunity to provide services for the general population, to be proactive on health and safety even when governments refuse to and to reveal inequities in the existing health and economic systems.”¹³⁴ One multi-country study demonstrates how youth-led groups have

Taiwan (Province of China)'s successful response to the pandemic included engaging hacktivists to produce an app that mapped where face masks were available and another that used smartphone location data to alert users when they were entering an area of high infection risk.¹²⁷ The measures build on the country's weekly hackathons, which encourage citizens to raise legislative issues for consideration by the government.

met the needs of communities where governments have failed to act, while also seizing opportunities to advocate for longer-term policies needed to build more inclusive societies.¹³⁵

It remains to be seen whether these short-term improvements in participation will become entrenched for the long term. Civil society has innovated in the face of new stresses and increased demand from communities, raising questions of whether this mobilization will be sustained.¹³⁷ Governments now have an opportunity to take a strategic approach to participation and to institutionalize models for including people in decision-making, releasing the pressure felt by citizens and channeling discontent towards playing a productive part in the rebuilding process.¹³⁸ There are risks, however. As the economic effects of the pandemic deepen, protests may intensify. Some governments may become less tolerant of dissent and less open to engaging others, undermining the social contract and “reinforcing the perception that there is no viable alternative [to violence] for expressing grievances and frustration.”¹³⁹

Youth organizations have capitalized on new technologies, organizing political and social solidarity campaigns, such as #LebanonProtests or #NiñasNoMadres, through Tik Tok, Instagram, and other social media platforms.¹³⁶

Denmark encouraged public participation during the pandemic by exempting ‘opinion-shaping assemblies’ such as political meetings and demonstrations from the law prohibiting public gatherings.¹⁴⁰

CORRUPTION AND CONFRONTING ABUSES

As part of the 2030 Agenda commitment to building more peaceful, just, and inclusive societies, SDG16.5 promises to “substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.”¹⁴¹

Corruption, and other state abuses, erode the social contract, by driving distrust and destroying faith in institutions. Abuses by the state increase exclusion and fuel grievances, contribute to political instability, and increase risks of violent conflict.¹⁴² Corruption also increases economic inequality and poverty, while there is “a large and statistically significant negative correlation between corruption and levels of confidence in public institutions.”¹⁴³ As the Managing Director of the IMF has argued, “corruption both feeds and is fed by the broader crisis of trust, which sustains a vicious cycle that undermines economic health and social cohesion.”¹⁴⁴ A corruption scandal can shift significant numbers of people from a high to a low-trust category – in a study of multiple local corruption scandals, the impacts on trust were still felt after a decade and sustained even when perceptions of corruption had improved.¹⁴⁵

While corruption destroys trust and damages the social contract, it is also symptomatic of the trustworthiness of an institution itself and reflects how people perceive the underlying rules of their societies.¹⁴⁶ Systemic corruption thrives when institutions are weak, power is centralized and expressed through patron-client relationships, and corrupt behavior is explicitly or tacitly tolerated.¹⁴⁷ Technical interventions to tackle corruption have tended to be ineffective when they fail to address these underlying drivers. More effective strategies aim to strengthen the relationships between citizen and state, providing accountability mechanisms with the political

and financial support they need to be effective, and challenging the political calculations and behaviors that make corruption self-reinforcing.¹⁴⁸ Tackling corruption can seldom be done piecemeal, but requires “deeper changes to governance or society that often allow for broad and collective progress.”¹⁴⁹

With estimated costs as high as 5 percent of global GDP, corruption was extensive before the pandemic struck.¹⁵⁰ The pandemic has created significant new risks.¹⁵¹ Emergency procurement programs for healthcare supplies may be captured by vested interests. Health workers may undermine trust by demanding bribes in return for care. Economic bailouts present new openings for fraud.¹⁵² At the same time, anti-corruption bodies are unable to do their work because of emergency measures.¹⁵³ A survey has found that COVID-19 response plans have paid “little attention to governance- and corruption-related matters,” while anti-corruption bodies have seldom been at the heart of multi-sectoral action.¹⁵⁴ This has happened despite past experience showing that corruption played a role in the “outbreak, spread, and slow containment” of the Ebola epidemic.¹⁵⁵ Ebola, too, demonstrated the long-lasting fallout from corruption scandals, with lasting public anger at those who were believed to have been “eating the Ebola money.”¹⁵⁶

Successful models for responding to corruption and other abuses will be of heightened relevance in the coming years as institutions rebuild after the pandemic. There is some potential for a breakthrough on corruption at a time of crisis, particularly through a two-pronged, ‘sandwich approach’ of both bottom-up and top-down action.¹⁵⁷ Measures to strengthen transparency will need to be complemented by accountability processes:

- Political will is critical. Political leadership can help to “close the gap between the laws on the books and the implementation on the ground.”¹⁵⁸ Collective leadership across groups of countries – for example through the G20 – has raised the profile of these problems while providing support to countries that face capacity deficits.¹⁵⁹ Respected stakeholders from outside government, such as religious leaders or former heads of state, have also played an important leadership role in these areas.¹⁶⁰
- Oversight bodies can play a key role in monitoring and exposing cases of corruption and rights abuses if they are given the remit and resources to adapt to changing circumstances during and after the pandemic. Increased funding for institutions such as anti-corruption agencies, audit institutions and the justice system broadens and strengthens monitoring capacity.¹⁶¹ As governments take on emergency powers, the oversight role of parliaments will be more important than ever, and they may need additional support to cope with the speed at which policies are implemented and the difficulty of vetting policies during periods of confinement.¹⁶²

- Openness to broader citizen engagement in developing policies and overseeing their implementation may make it more likely that corruption and other abuses will be exposed. The Open Government Partnership, for example, encourages governments to commit to transparency and accountability in policy implementation and citizens, civil society, and business to ensure the commitments are met.¹⁶³ Opening up data to public scrutiny has helped citizens to track whether the implementation of rescue packages is honest and fair. People-centered approaches to tackling corruption are also important in ensuring instances of abuse are exposed, including establishing complaints procedures for individuals to report petty corruption and measures to protect people who expose corruption.¹⁶⁴
- New technologies offer opportunities for tackling corruption and abuse. Online portals allow for real-time information disclosure and for more transparent contracting processes. Digital payments platforms can reduce the risk of fraud. SMS or other mobile reporting mechanisms can be a safer channel for the reporting of rights infringements, while websites that allow citizens to document and publicize such infringements have been used to shine a light on abusers.¹⁶⁶ Digital tools such as online and protected whistleblowing platforms help tackle corruption, while increased digitalization often improves government functioning and reduces opportunities for corruption.

The challenge of eliminating the activities that destroy trust in governance institutions is a long-term one. Corruption during the response to the pandemic may not come to light until several years later. Its exposure threatens to drive significant increases in distrust even as economies and societies are getting back on their feet, thereby eroding the still-fragile social contract.¹⁶⁸ Governments will require the assistance of multiple overseers in the short term if they are to minimize abuses and avoid storing up trouble for later stages of the recovery.

Paraguay and Ukraine introduced open contracting policies during the COVID-19 emergency, where information on tenders and contract awards is made available to the public.¹⁶⁵

In Guatemala, long-standing anti-corruption movements have had to change to change tactics amidst lockdown measures, moving increasingly to online, digital spaces while also continuing to protest on the streets with protective equipment.¹⁶⁷

In Malawi, cash transfers to help those whose incomes have suffered have been made using digital payment systems that reduce the risk of corruption. The National Registration Bureau database is used to authenticate payments.¹⁶⁹

Senegal – which has been heralded globally for its response to COVID-19, at one point ranking #2 in response by Foreign Policy – has prioritized transparency, both in terms of communication with the public and in its commitment to maintaining full transparency and accountability of emergency spending under its Debt Service Relief Initiative.¹⁷⁰

To strengthen its capacity to assist Congress in overseeing government expenditure during the COVID-19 crisis, the United States included additional funding for the Government Accountability Office in its economic stimulus package.¹⁷¹

SPOTLIGHT

PROTECTING CORE GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS

As the Secretary-General has argued, “if there is one word that characterizes today’s world, it is fragility.”¹⁷⁶ The COVID-19 pandemic has put governments under unprecedented stress, challenging their day-to-day operations and – in the worst case – threatening their ability to discharge their core functions.¹⁷⁷ Without investing in and protecting these functions, a sustainable recovery will not be possible, with impacts on the most vulnerable people in the world.¹⁷⁸ Especially in countries that struggle to service their debt or in those that experience shocks in addition to the pandemic (for example, a natural disaster or famine), external support will be needed to ensure governments are able to maintain at least “minimal fiscal space.”¹⁷⁹ If this fails to happen,

the economic shock associated with COVID-19 has the potential to act as a trigger for violent conflict, especially in countries where conflict risks are already high.¹⁸⁰

Key to an effective governance response are public financial management¹⁸¹ and agile treasury operations.¹⁸² From immediate fiscal and financial sector responses¹⁸³ to longer term economic recovery packages focused on reconstruction and resilience,¹⁸⁴ treasury and finance departments need to operate creatively to keep government running. This includes providing cash to pay for public services, minimizing red tape in processing and disbursing payments, and being transparent about spending.¹⁸⁵

PROVISION OF BASIC AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES

The pandemic has reinforced the importance of the public sector and public service delivery, whether in terms of healthcare, public transportation, water and sanitation, food security, education, or financial services, and whether delivered through public sector entities and state-owned enterprises or private sector providers.¹⁸⁶

Some countries are already struggling to pay their civil servants,¹⁸⁷ while others report double digit declines in domestic resource mobilization.¹⁸⁸ With aid budgets under pressure,¹⁸⁹ international investments need to be targeted to “avoid exacerbating existing sources of fragility and instead help build resilience, both to this crisis and future shocks.”¹⁹⁰ Priorities include protecting health systems,¹⁹¹ including for non-COVID priorities such as basic immunization;¹⁹² making up lost education, in countries where few children are online;¹⁹³ and increasing food security at a time when the World Food Programme has warned that “famine is literally on the horizon.”¹⁹⁴

Initial lessons from pandemic responses also highlight the importance of adaptability, the role of technology in modernizing services, and the importance of maintaining continuity.¹⁹⁵

Governments globally continue to face economic collapse and debt default, risking a “debt tsunami”, as COVID-19 numbers continue to rise in many contexts, worsening humanitarian situations.¹⁷²

The protection of human rights, the maintenance of basic freedoms, and the ability to dissent as core to democratic rule is often discarded in the name of protecting public health or public security.¹⁷³

SECURITY AND PREVENTION

The provision of security and the rule of law is critical to core government functioning. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, for example, “adequate governance of the security sector is now more relevant than ever. Effectively sustaining peace and preventing conflict while responding to a public health emergency will depend on the ability of governments to uphold the core principles on security sector reform set forth in Security Council resolution 2151 (2014).”¹⁹⁶

While COVID-19 did not lead to an immediate increase in conflict,¹⁹⁷ medium and long-term risks are elevated, including in countries that were not previously seen as high risk.¹⁹⁸ Justice systems are on the frontline of the pandemic response in all countries, designing and enforcing public health restrictions¹⁹⁹ and responding to the justice problems that result from an economic shock (domestic violence, evictions, employment and contract disputes, etc.).²⁰⁰ Police reform is an especially important priority, given the potential for discriminatory and violent practices to threaten social cohesion and erode government legitimacy.²⁰¹

*The number of people suffering from food insecurity is set to double in 2020, with those in conflict zones most at risk of severe food insecurity and even famine, further risking an increase in violence, insecurity, and state breakdown.*¹⁷⁴

LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND INCLUSIVE DECISION-MAKING

In protecting core government functions, it is also important to protect democratic decision-making and the mechanisms by which governments are elected and represent the people. Amidst the pandemic, elections have been altered, delayed or cancelled.²⁰² As governments adapt, a focus on maintaining the integrity of elections, ensuring political processes are inclusive, and providing civic space is key.

As the World Bank and United Nations have argued, community engagement is essential during a crisis: “governments need support so that they can publicly engage with broad swathes of society – including youth, women, trade unions, the private sector, and marginalized groups – in the emergency phase and well beyond it, to help with analysis, design, implementation and monitoring of programs.”

In states facing the highest risks to peace and stability, local ownership of peacebuilding “can serve to extend the space for public engagement in... dialogue and encourage political elites to engage.”²⁰³ International diplomatic and security action has created space for inclusive decision-making, while also providing direct support for elections, human rights, and security sector reform.²⁰⁴

*Public sector employees, including those on the frontlines, suffer job losses as governments are unable to pay their staff, risking further societal and economic disruption.*¹⁷⁵

TWO

SOLVING PROBLEMS THAT MATTER

Rebuilding the social contract between the state and citizens is fundamental to countries' long-term stability and prosperity. But if governments do not deliver in solving the problems that matter most to people, the divide between leaders and citizens will widen further and the COVID-19 crisis will imperil not just health and economies but potentially the survival of nation states themselves. Balancing health and economic priorities while ensuring that inequalities are reduced rather than exacerbated is a difficult but vital task if societies are to mitigate the worst effects of the pandemic and put in place the building blocks for a more resilient future.

As discussed in the introduction, the effectiveness of institutions is an important determinant of citizens' trust in them. Institutions around the world were already under strain before 2020, but with the advent of COVID-19, the delivery challenge is now much greater. Problems have both multiplied and intensified, affecting sectors including the economy, healthcare, education, justice, and transport.

In response to increased demand, most governments have attempted to ramp up service delivery.²⁰⁵ But the virus has rapidly weakened the capacity to provide effective services, by infecting service providers, closing government buildings, making it harder to reach those in need, and draining financial resources as countries are forced to borrow heavily to pay for enhanced services and keep economies afloat. As countries move out of the acute phase of the public health emergency and economic problems grow more severe, the capacity to respond to people's needs is likely to come under further strain.

Effective delivery requires institutions that solve the problems that matter most to people, and in the wake of COVID-19, governments – and the multilateral system itself – will be judged on whether these institutions have been effective. The more inclusive the governance and decision-making process is, the more inclusive the development outcomes and ultimate delivery is likely to be.²⁰⁶

In this section we look at the delivery challenge through three lenses. First, we assess how decisions have been taken during the immediate crisis – in particular, how public health and economic priorities have been reconciled. Decisions have been taken under pressure and in conditions of considerable uncertainty, with their outcomes assessed and reassessed as infections ebb and flow. As one official in an OECD country has observed, "It's extraordinary how quickly things move and turn. There seems to be a narrative from some that there's a fixed body of evidence on how to deal with things. It's not like that."²⁰⁷

Second, we examine how governments are tackling distribution of services in core sectors as COVID-19 adds new dimensions to the inequality challenge. Failures of service delivery have dramatic impacts on the most vulnerable. An estimated 94 million children have missed doses of measles vaccines, for example, while an additional 6,000 children and 300 women are at risk of dying each day as essential health services are disrupted.²⁰⁸ More broadly, COVID-19 has led to an immediate and dramatic increase in inequality.²⁰⁹ Based on past pandemics, the impact on both inequality and social mobility is likely to be long-lasting without an effective policy

response.²¹⁰ According to economists from the World Bank and the Centre for Disaster Protection, “the implications for equity of every policy need to be considered and accounted for, even those that are geared to address short-term goals of economic relief or accelerating growth for recovery.”²¹¹

Third, we ask whether governance is changing in the face of the pandemic, and whether in the longer-term governments can act as a platform for tackling increasingly complex and interdependent challenges. The Secretary-General is one among many who have argued that “we can’t go back to the way things were before the pandemic.”²¹² But it is far from inevitable that institutions will emerge stronger. For that to happen, countries will need to learn lessons from the pandemic, understanding rapidly changing demands on the public sector, and move from firefighting to longer-term strategies for reform.

DECISION MAKING UNDER PRESSURE

The sudden onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has meant that governments have had to make decisions under considerable pressure – and a time when most found that they were ill-prepared for the pandemic. Some countries that were supposedly well equipped to cope with a major epidemic have experienced exceptionally high levels of infection and mortality,²¹³ suggesting that expectations of what preparedness looked like did not match what was needed in reality.²¹⁴ Beyond the health impacts, moreover, decision-makers have limited research and few effective case studies to draw on when dealing with the economic consequences of such a crisis.²¹⁵

Under conditions of such uncertainty, governments have inevitably had to base decisions on imperfect information. In some countries there have been questions over whether decision-makers have understood or even paid heed to evidence about the virus and its economic and social fallout. For example, while significant majorities of people in New Zealand, China, and Germany believe their governments have followed scientific advice, most people in the United States, Brazil, and United Kingdom believe advice has been ignored.²¹⁶

But scientific data is not the only information that needs to be considered – evidence on how to effect behavior change is also important, for example, as is data on the effectiveness of rescue and recovery packages. In many countries, politicians have failed to consider the gamut of relevant data, tending instead to “trawl for evidence that suits their purposes or invest selectively in the types of research that are likely to show them in a favorable light.”²¹⁷

Effective strategies for making decisions under conditions of uncertainty have four main components:

- A ‘center of command’ at the heart of government, which leads a whole-of-government response.²¹⁸
- Transparency about who is responsible for taking decisions, how decisions are taken, and what advice is drawn on.²¹⁹
- Efforts to increase the breadth of evidence that is considered and to gain inputs from people and groups who are directly affected.²²⁰
- External communications that admit uncertainty and build consensus around proposed solutions.²²¹

For governments, the most contentious and challenging decisions have concerned the relative weight given to economic and public health strategies.²²⁵ The IMF has described the idea of a tradeoff between saving lives and saving livelihoods as a “false dilemma.”²²⁶ In broad terms, good economic outcomes come from robust and inclusive health policies, which address the underlying causes of the emergency and protect the foundations for future economic growth.²²⁷ But governments have faced pressure from interest groups and individual citizens to keep economies open, while many have experienced intense debate *within* government over the pace and intensity of public health measures that limit economic activity.

Trade-offs also vary between countries. Based on the track record of 51 countries, lockdown measures appear to be less effective at reducing the number of deaths and more costly in a poorer country than a richer one, possibly because poorer populations have fewer resources and tend to receive less support when economic activity is drastically reduced.²²⁸ Many developing countries have opted for tight restrictions but have tended to sustain them for a shorter period of time.²²⁹

Conversely, fiscal transfers appear to have a much bigger multiplier effect in poorer countries than in advanced economies, but poorer countries have less capacity to sustain expansionary fiscal policies.²³⁰ To this end, while as of January 2021, 30 percent of the top 20 countries with the highest mortality rate were in Western Europe,²³¹ the projected impact of COVID-19 on least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, and small island developing states is significantly heavier and longer-lasting, in part due to high national debt, a shortage of financial resources, and vulnerable health systems.²³² This highlights the need for approaches to containment and economic support that are adapted to a country’s risks and capacities.²³³

Managing trade-offs effectively requires broad consultation and engagement over the long term:

- **Whole-of-government response.** Involving all arms and levels of government in planning how to tackle the broad range of impacts

Cambodia set up a National Committee for COVID-19, chaired by the Prime Minister, which leads policymaking and implementation at all levels in response to the health crisis and its economic and social impacts.²²²

The Netherlands consulted 30,000 citizens on the options for easing lockdown measures. Participants were informed of the likely impacts of each option and asked which recommendations they favored.²²³

The governor of the Indonesian state of Central Java has used social media to communicate personally with the public during the pandemic, including delivering messages on infection rates and prevention measures.²²⁴

of COVID-19 can help ensure competing priorities are highlighted and weighed up. Led by the head of government, finance and planning ministries in particular are likely to play key roles in designing a balanced response.²³⁴

- **Consideration of different timescales.** Trade-offs will also have to be made between the short-term recovery from the pandemic and long-term resilience to similar crises.²³⁵ While the immediate focus is likely to be on protection from health and economic impacts, in the longer term the focus will have to shift towards building more inclusive and sustainable institutions and societies that are less vulnerable to major shocks.²³⁶
- **Direct engagement of those affected by the trade-offs.** There is evidence that people may not understand trade-offs in the way policymakers assume – for example, in the Netherlands, the public in general are willing to accept substantial economic damage, but the older population who are most at risk from COVID-19 are least accepting of economic damage that impacts younger generations.²³⁷ Involving people in considering trade-offs can help policymakers identify areas for maneuver. The key to this process is transparency. Having learned from SARS 17 years prior, East Asian countries, for example, prioritized communication about COVID-19 with the public, contributing to overall success in curbing the spread of the virus.²³⁸
- **Incorporating good governance tenets,** such as accountability, transparency, equity, participation, and the rule of law, into decision-making processes. Lessons from COVID-19 demonstrate that public health preparedness assessments did not adequately account for the governance dimensions of response and recovery at national and international levels.²³⁹

Among various contributing factors, Vietnam's focus on public engagement and awareness was key to COVID-19 response, engaging traditional and mass media, government sites, grassroots organizations, "posters at hospitals, offices, residential buildings, and markets, as well as phone and text messages."²⁴⁰

South Korea's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) benefited from the support of critical ministries as it led the response to the pandemic.²⁴¹ KCDC worked with the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Interior and Safety to define clear responsibilities that were "assigned throughout the government on prevention and containment, ground-level response, and treatment and quarantine."²⁴²

The government of Kerala in India launched a mobile application that provided verified and authentic information from authorities directly to the general public. The information was periodically updated and made available in different languages for the state's multilingual population.²⁴³

REDUCING INEQUALITIES DURING AND AFTER THE PANDEMIC

In responding to COVID-19 and its impacts, governments and institutions have not only had to manage tensions across sectors, but also to innovate and improvise the delivery and distribution of public policies and services in the areas that matter most: health, education, and jobs. Until now, less affluent population groups have borne the brunt of the health and economic costs of the pandemic.²⁴⁴ If governments are to rebuild the social contract, however, efforts will need to be made to share the burden more equitably.

The perception that measures are fair is often at least as important as objective indicators. Evidence from Latin America suggests that, in their satisfaction with the economy, people are not greatly influenced by traditional objective measures such as GDP, the risk of unemployment or hard measures of inequality such as changes in the Gini coefficient.²⁴⁵ But they are strongly influenced by their

perceptions of fairness or unfairness in the actual and expected distribution of resources. Governments must therefore not only address distributional questions, but be *seen* to have addressed them – both delivery and perceptions of delivery are important.

With regard to the health impacts of the pandemic, populations that were already marginalized have been rendered especially vulnerable, due to socioeconomic disadvantage, weak access to healthcare, and systematic patterns of discrimination and disadvantage.²⁴⁶ In both high and low-income countries, people living in poorer areas or those in minority ethnic communities have experienced more serious health impacts than others.²⁴⁷ Between countries, too, there have been distributional challenges with regard to the availability of personal protective equipment for health workers, ventilators, and testing kits, and vaccine rollout may present similar problems.²⁴⁸

A number of factors have put some countries in a better position than others to mount an equitable response to the health emergency. These include whether they have invested in health infrastructure;²⁴⁹ whether they have universal government-funded healthcare or universal health insurance systems; whether, like much of South East Asia, they have learned lessons from previous pandemics; and whether their governance structures are effective.²⁵⁰ At a time when demands are evolving rapidly, the need for agile health governance that encourages innovation is critical.

To make societies more resilient to future health threats, however, all countries will need to make more concerted efforts to reduce health inequalities. More equitable health governance can build on and learn from existing governance structures that are inclusive and people-centered, enlisting the support of other sectors and involving communities in planning and implementation.²⁵² Many of the world's most effective health systems were “put in place by leaders in the aftermath or even in the middle of national crises,” and more ambitious institutional innovations aim to significantly expand coverage *during* the pandemic as part of a long-term shift towards universal health coverage.²⁵³ Emergency reforms aimed at cushioning the inequitable impacts of the virus can be made permanent in order to mitigate the effects of future health shocks.

COVID-19 has substantially exacerbated educational inequality, with the pandemic causing “the largest disruption of education systems in history.”²⁵⁵ Its greatest impacts have been on children who already experience the highest levels of education inequality. At the peak of the first wave of the virus, 1.6 billion children and young people were out of school and university²⁵⁶ – over 90 percent of the world's total – and a four-month school closure was expected to cost learners \$10 trillion in lifetime earnings.²⁵⁷ Finance is now likely to be diverted from the sector, with the World Bank predicting a “triple funding shock” as governments, households, and international donors cut expenditure.²⁵⁸

*Peru adapted to the challenge of the pandemic by providing temporary health coverage to large numbers of Venezuelan refugees, thereby protecting refugees themselves and reducing the risk of transmission within the country as a whole.*²⁵¹

*Governments in Ukraine, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea are expanding primary healthcare coverage and taking it closer to communities in response to the pandemic, as part of policies to maintain more comprehensive services in the longer term.*²⁵⁴

The pandemic has accelerated the shift towards the use of digital technologies in education, but the least privileged students are least likely to benefit from online learning. Remote learning has also created novel governance challenges. It has largely taken place on platforms that have been developed and are controlled by global technology companies whose interests are not always aligned with those of governments. Public sector education systems have struggled to implement these systems effectively, with “few (if any) education systems, even the most high performing ... well equipped to offer online learning for all students at scale, quickly.”²⁵⁹

Instead of ‘building back better’ after the pandemic, education systems may suffer in many countries, starving children of opportunities and exacerbating already dangerously high levels of inequality. In the short term, countries are developing mechanisms for providing additional support to help the most vulnerable children to catch up with lost learning, while ensuring that educational technologies do not further increase marginalization.²⁶³ In the longer-term and as COVID-19 recoveries continue, the challenge is to:

- Promote equality in education through policies that shift “the curriculum, assessment, and examinations – and the overall orientation of the system – away from elite students, and toward the actual skill distribution in the entire student population.”²⁶⁴
- Adopt a strategic approach to promoting digital inclusion and equity, through a national remote learning strategy or by establishing bodies with responsibilities for ensuring that vulnerable learners benefit from digital technologies.²⁶⁵
- Increase policy coherence with other sectors, for example by ensuring that education needs are considered while developing health and economic responses to the pandemic, and that education policymakers are aware of the likely impacts on their sector of health and economic policies and trends.²⁶⁶

In the United States, free public access Wi-Fi locations have been set up in the grounds of closed schools so that families without home internet access can access remote learning opportunities.²⁶⁰

In Peru, the Wawa laptop project gives vulnerable students solar-powered laptops “made from recycled materials that run on free Android and Linux operating systems.”²⁶¹

The government of Costa Rica is providing hard copies of learning materials to students who do not have internet access.²⁶²

GOVERNMENT AS A PLATFORM FOR POLICY, PARTNERSHIP, AND PUBLIC SERVICE INNOVATION

Governments have had to adjust and adapt at speed to address the three tiers of the COVID-19 emergency – public health, economic, and social. This has led to a shift in the relationship between citizen and state, as governments take a more active role in helping citizens and businesses to survive the crisis,²⁶⁷ and citizens and businesses become more reliant on – and potentially more approving of – large-scale state support.²⁶⁸ On the other hand, record levels of sovereign debt and the potential for a protracted debt crisis may, in the longer term, make it harder for governments to meet these increased societal expectations, especially in developing countries that have limited access to credit markets.²⁶⁹

Looking beyond the immediate impacts of the pandemic, governments will be under pressure from three directions. First, they will face constrained resources, which are likely to lead to expenditure cuts and tax rises in many countries.²⁷⁰ This pressure will be greatest for local governments, which play a disproportionate role in service delivery.²⁷¹ Second, they will face continued demand for crisis response measures, especially economic measures. And third, they will need to create space for longer-term policy priorities, not only investing to support economic recovery but also transforming economies and societies so that they will be better able to achieve the SDGs.²⁷²

The COVID-19 crisis creates an opportunity to transform governments to end the current emergency, meet long-term needs, and increase resilience in the face of future shocks.²⁷³

The challenge for governments is to re-imagine themselves as platforms for enabling more sustainable and resilient patterns of development, “while also guaranteeing accountability, maintaining trust in public policies and actions, often using new tools and technologies, and engaging and working with citizens and stakeholders in different ways.”²⁷⁴

Governments that effectively act as such platforms focus on three areas of reform.

First, they are **people-centered**. To respond effectively to the problems that really matter, public services have to become more people-centric. Instead of focusing on what existing institutions can deliver, they reorient themselves to respond to people’s (and businesses’) expressed needs and to involve them in the responses.²⁷⁵ They break down silos between sectors so that they can collaborate and innovate to meet people’s needs.²⁷⁶ And they provide opportunities for people to participate more thoroughly in the design, delivery, and evaluation of public services.

Second, they develop and nurture **new partnerships**, recognizing that in a complex world, governments cannot do everything. Within government, this requires better **integration**, including through an increased role for local actors and cooperation between different tiers of government to solve complex policy problems.²⁷⁸ Integration is facilitated by governance mechanisms that help manage shared responsibilities, such as “dialogue platforms, fiscal councils, standing commissions and intergovernmental consultation boards, and contractual arrangements.”²⁷⁹ In tackling the crisis, centers of government have often proved critical, strengthening horizontal integration across government, from coordination and planning to evidenced, informed decision-making and public communication and engagement.²⁸⁰ In many contexts, vertical integration has also been key, with sub-national governments also being represented in pandemic response decision-making bodies.

The government of Singapore engages businesses in its periodic economic reviews. The private sector is represented on the committees that develop the reviews, providing “invaluable, fresh views from their respective vantage points in industry, as well as along different parts of economic value chains.”²⁷⁷

Beyond government, **partnerships** with the private sector and civil society such as those deployed to combat COVID-19 can encourage more innovative and flexible problem solving responses.²⁸¹ These partners can play a role in identifying needs and designing and implementing policies and programs that meet them. The depth of governments' role in such partnerships will vary depending on the problem being addressed, but they can play an important role in convening networks and in providing a "clear, predictable and legitimate institutional framework" as partnerships evolve.²⁸²

Third, **digital** technologies can be used to facilitate people-centered, partnership-based approaches. Many public sector organizations around the world have digitalized services to enable them to keep functioning during lockdowns, while strengthening their internal systems to allow for teleworking. Harnessing the creativity and resources of private and third-sector organizations to accelerate the digital transformation can help develop and deliver services that are more responsive to people's needs.²⁸⁴

At the same time, it will be important to ensure that digitalization does not infringe upon privacy nor exacerbate inequality by making it harder for vulnerable groups to access services. Efforts will need to be made to narrow existing digital divides, ensuring that services and information are available to those who lack internet connectivity, for example, or reliable access to electricity.²⁸⁵ Even among those who do have connectivity, some will require digital skills training if they are to see the new systems as an improvement on offline systems.

The Indian state of Kerala relied on inter-institutional coordination of bodies from within the health system and from other government departments in its successful response to the health impacts of the pandemic. It also consistently engaged citizens in the decision-making process, consulting them on trade-offs and informing them about decisions made.²⁸³

Singapore's #SmartNationTogether program is an online initiative launched in June 2020 to equip people to use technology to overcome the health and economic impacts of the pandemic. A joint effort between the government and community and corporate volunteers, in its first two months it had engaged 6,000 participants.²⁸⁶

SPOTLIGHT

RE-IMAGINING PUBLIC SERVICE

Public service and public servants have been extraordinarily stretched by COVID-19. From response to recovery, their role has been critical, highlighting their importance for the functioning of societies while also generating calls for reform, investment, and innovation. COVID-19 has demonstrated the benefits of a stronger and more flexible civil service, with surge capacity and which is able to incorporate risk management and contingency planning into its daily processes and practices.²⁸⁷

From investment and capacity development to digitalization, user-centered design, and rebuilding public service to better reflect those it serves, engaging and motivating healthy public sector employees, post-pandemic, will be key for longer-term change and innovation.²⁸⁸

MEETING PEOPLE WHERE THEY ARE: DIGITALIZATION, USER-CENTERED DESIGN AND COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

COVID-19 has increased demand for virtual service delivery and public sector operations, with digitalization moving from a nice-to-have to a must-have. Examples include widespread remote working, agile tools to reallocate the workforce, financial management and procurement tools, and streamlined and technology-enhanced people management processes such as recruitment and training.²⁸⁹

The digitalization of services can help to increase the accessibility and affordability of services and lower transaction costs, while providing more timely information for policymaking.²⁹⁰ User-centered design allows for citizens and communities to feel confident in the legitimacy and functioning of their representatives and institutions, while driving innovation in service delivery, better data, and improved policy decisions.²⁹¹

Digitalization can also help drive citizen engagement and partnership. Collective intelligence uses new technology to harness the ideas and skills of the public, from healthcare to sustainability.²⁹²

Despite the increased emphasis and promise of digitalization and public service reform, barriers to its adoption and utilization exist. These include digital disparities between national and local governments, as well as issues of internet connectivity and digital skills among lower-income, rural, and more marginalized population groups.

MAKING THE PUBLIC SECTOR LOOK LIKE THE PUBLIC: NON-DISCRIMINATION IN PRACTICE

In 'building back better', addressing patterns of exclusion and discrimination by gender, income group, ethnicity, etc., and at all levels of public service – senior civil servants, legislatures, public employees, public service commissions, and the police – provides a key opportunity in reimagining and rebuilding public service. Inclusion not only promotes greater diversity, but also a shift in “control that is often held in check by the majority, and thus promotes the exercise of collective influence that changes behavior and can advance change.”²⁹³ While there has been much talk of diversity, equality, and inclusion in the workforce, there may be greater opportunities for implementation as governments and societies recover from COVID-19.

Focus is also being placed on addressing discrimination by the public sector. For example, and acknowledging the novel and significant challenges posed by the pandemic, the use of excessive force by law enforcement across national contexts when applying emergency and other measures has often fallen disproportionately on minority and low income groups, marginalized communities, and homeless populations.²⁹⁴ Addressing this trend offers an additional opportunity to further reimagine public service, with many reforms proposed focused on enabling trust and accountability through more formal participation and partnerships between community members and law enforcement.²⁹⁵

PREPARING FOR THE NEXT CRISIS: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

COVID-19 has posed staffing challenges across public administrations. To support business continuity, and fluctuation and future spikes in demand for public services, governments are increasingly investing in surge capacity, as well as staff re-mapping and reassignment based on transferable skill sets in the immediate term.²⁹⁶

Additional approaches include hiring new personnel and developing emergency corps for future pandemics.²⁹⁷ Investment and new, multi-sectoral partnerships with philanthropy, academia, and the private sector can also help to train public servants, including as related to digital skills and training.²⁹⁸ As argued by apolitical, “this could be best achieved by directly employing public servants with skills in emerging technologies like data science, machine learning, digital design, and computer science rather than outsourcing these high-tech skills.”²⁹⁹

CONCLUSION

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL ACTION

While there is increased interest and demand for international cooperation to deal with the pandemic, there is also diminished trust in international institutions to effectively do so.³⁰⁰ This section addresses challenges to international governance amplified by COVID-19 and discusses how international collective action and strengthened global governance can both support a more effective response to COVID-19 at national levels and help countries to build back better after the virus subsides.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE UNDER STRESS

In September 2020, the UN Secretary-General told the UN Security Council that the COVID-19 pandemic was exacerbating global tensions and heightening global risks in unpredictable and dangerous ways. “The pandemic is a clear test of international cooperation,” he said, “a test we have essentially failed.”³⁰¹ Further fragmentation and polarization, he said, risked a repeat of the chaos of the first half of the twentieth century. He called for reinvigorated collective action for a world of interconnected threats and for more inclusive and networked global institutions that “can act decisively, based on global consent, for the global good.”

SDG16.6 makes a commitment to effective, accountable, and transparent institutions *at all levels*. While this paper focuses primarily on institutions *within* countries, global governance – or the lack of it – shapes the context for national action. A growing proportion of contemporary challenges have a transnational dimension; very few can be addressed solely within national borders. The pandemic has both heightened interdependence and created new forms of division – with implications for all dimensions of the crisis.

COVID-19 had spread to at least 174 countries within three months of the first reports to the World Health Organization.³⁰² According to the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, the failure of pandemic preparedness revealed failures of global and national governance, with gaps in national decision-making, a lack of coordination and collective action through international institutions, underfunding of public health systems, and failure to prepare for the broader economic and financial impacts of the pandemic.³⁰³ The board places robust governance at local, national, regional, and global levels at the center of its model for pandemic preparedness and responsive, linking four levers of responsible leadership, engaged citizenship, agile systems, and sustained investment.³⁰⁴

The distribution of COVID-19 vaccines is further heightening governance challenges, with the potential for “an ugly global race for enough vaccine that will by no means be fair.”³⁰⁵ According to a study by the Eurasia Group, equitable access to vaccines would generate an estimated US\$153 billion in economic benefits in 2020/21.³⁰⁶ It is unclear, however, to what extent allocation decisions will be guided by the World Health Organization framework for fair and equitable allocation of COVID-19 health products,³⁰⁷ or whether the COVAX financing facility will receive sufficient funding to

meet the needs of 92 countries eligible for financial support.³⁰⁸ Beyond the current pandemic, the world faces the question of whether it finally resolves to invest in the global health governance systems that are needed to prepare for future threats, or whether the next pandemic – or a non-pandemic risks such as widespread antimicrobial resistance – will be as damaging as COVID-19.³⁰⁹

As was argued in the second section of this paper, bringing COVID-19 under control is fundamental to a sustained economic recovery. Global economic risks were already high when the pandemic hit, with the OECD Secretary-General warning of “a long-term future of low growth and declining living standards” due to underinvestment, protectionism, and growing pressure from climate change and other longer-term threats.³¹⁰ The IMF expects any recovery to be “long, uneven, and uncertain,” with global cooperation needed to support countries facing debt crises, protect global supply chains, defuse trade tensions, and encourage joint action by major economies on climate change.³¹¹ These challenges will be faced at a time when the global financial, economic, trade, and debt architectures are in need of reform,³¹² while the G20 has so far failed to unite behind a global plan for growth.³¹³

The scale of finance needed by African economies illustrates the scale of the task ahead. On the one hand, they face a financing gap of \$200 billion to \$1.3 trillion to implement the SDGs, with an annual investment gap for infrastructure alone of more than \$100 billion.³¹⁴ On the other hand, a growing number of countries face a debt crisis, with the Economic Commission for Africa calling for “a robust liquidity and structural response, recovery and reset toolbox [to] be developed in partnership between emerging markets, the private sector, and the G20.”³¹⁵

According to the UN Secretary-General, COVID-19 has the potential to be “a game-changer for international peace and security.”³¹⁶ The fallout from the pandemic has stressed all societies, providing new opportunities for armed groups and for cyberterrorism, cybercrime, disinformation, and other disruptive tactics.³¹⁷ Beyond further waves of the pandemic itself, a survey of experts from the field of international relations finds that political polarization within countries, geopolitical tensions between countries, and the weakness of international organizations are the main obstacles to global recovery.³¹⁸

Early in the pandemic, the Secretary-General called for a global ceasefire.³¹⁹ However, it was only after a painful negotiation that the Security Council responded.³²⁰ By September, more than 20,000 people had been killed in conflict since the initial appeal was made,³²¹ with the UN now warning of conflict-induced famine in South Sudan, the DRC, and Nigeria.³²² A significant spread of insecurity – or a further rise in geopolitical tensions – could seriously damage recovery nationally, across regions, or even globally, but there is, as yet, little sign of an international commitment to preventing these threats that matches the efforts to protect public health or the economy.³²³

Recent months have also seen a surge in misinformation and disinformation campaigns around the pandemic, hamstringing an effective and efficient global response to COVID-19.³²⁴ Disinformation campaigns increasingly cross borders and can only be tackled through collective action.³²⁵ These campaigns are designed to increase polarization, destroy trust in mainstream media and institutions, and corrupt elections and the values that underpin inclusive politics.³²⁶ Governments face challenges regulating online platforms in ways that promote accountability

while also respecting basic freedoms.³²⁷ New rules for the digital economy may be needed to govern “the intangible assets on which most of the developed economy, and increasingly the health of our societies, now depend.”³²⁸

According to a survey undertaken as part of the UN’s 75th anniversary, public demand for enhanced international cooperation is strong, with 86 percent of respondents saying international cooperation is either essential or very important for addressing global challenges and half believing that increased cooperation is needed between countries in light of the pandemic.³²⁹ Participants in the UN75 dialogues, however, called on the UN and the broader multilateral system to be more innovative and “more inclusive of the diversity of actors in the 21st century.”³³⁰ During the 2020s, the scope for national action will be determined – at least in part – by whether the international system can meet this demand.

GOVERNANCE SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL ACTION

As the world transitions from response to recovery, global collective action can support governance at national levels. It can assist the development of a renewed social contract, support government delivery, and help protect against future risks.

SUPPORT FOR THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

While renewal of the social contract must happen primarily within societies, national action can be supported through a global focus on promoting social and economic inclusion, strengthening political inclusion by supporting civil society and the media, and tackling the transnational drivers of corruption and other abuses.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION

Global support for social protection

Universal social protection has emerged as a global policy priority over the past twenty years, as the focus moved from minimal safety nets to more ambitious efforts to protect people from risk both as “a basic right and a social investment.”³³¹

Social protection is part of the vision of the 2030 Agenda (“all people must enjoy a basic standard of living, including through social protection systems”), with a number of initiatives aiming to support the acceleration of progress towards SDG1.3.³³² The ILO and World Bank have developed a shared mission for universal social protection “where anyone who needs social protection can access it at any time.”³³³ The Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals brings together multilateral organizations, development banks, aid agencies and international NGOs.³³⁴ The civil society-led Global Coalition for Social Protection Floors has called for a solidarity based Global Financing Mechanism for Social Protection³³⁵ and – more recently – a Global Fund for Social Protection to protect the most vulnerable during COVID-19 and beyond.³³⁶

Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, the global financing gap faced by social protection systems is estimated to have increased by almost one-third.³³⁷ UNCTAD estimates that developing countries require a \$2.5 trillion international COVID-19 package, including \$500 billion for health and social relief.³³⁸ Given the substantial, if temporary, increases in coverage discussed in part 1 of this report, the international

community has an opportunity to build consensus behind a new strategy for tackling the political, financing, and delivery bottlenecks that block full coverage.³³⁹

This will not be possible if increased debt leads to a fiscal retrenchment. Global debt increased by \$15 trillion in the first nine months of 2020³⁴⁰ and while some temporary relief measures are in place, there is widespread acceptance that current debt frameworks need to be adapted to more complex creditor landscapes and new forms of lending.³⁴¹ Longer-term reforms will be needed – including expanding special drawing rights,³⁴² early debt restructuring for countries with unsustainable debt burdens,³⁴³ and developing local capital markets and better regulated financial markets for poorer countries³⁴⁴ - to ensure that the space for social protection remains open after the pandemic subsides.

Broader global policies to tackle inequality post-COVID

The pandemic has led to a greatly increased global focus on reducing inequality, both within and between countries.

There has been leadership from international organizations, with the managing director of the IMF warning that every recent pandemic has led to an “increase in inequality that was sustained years after the pandemic was over.”³⁴⁵ Country leaders have come together to “identify practical and politically viable solutions to the challenge of inequality and exclusion in our own societies and globally.”³⁴⁶ And the COVAX Facility has brought together governments, scientists, the private sector, philanthropists, and civil society in an effort to ensure equitable distribution of coronavirus vaccines.³⁴⁷

There is a risk, however, that global concern will not translate into meaningful reductions in inequality. Increased financing is needed for the equitable distribution of vaccines,³⁴⁸ with the IMF estimating that faster access to vaccinations and therapeutics would raise global income by \$9 trillion between 2020 and 2025.³⁴⁹ In addition to support for social protection (discussed above), action is needed to increase universal health coverage (for example, through the UHC2030 International Health Partnership)³⁵⁰ and to tackle a learning crisis that has been significantly worsened by the pandemic.³⁵¹

To avoid “an uneven and incomplete recovery” that would increase inequality within and between countries, policies coordination will be needed between economies to support labor markets and enable people to retrain and find new jobs, especially in countries that currently have limited fiscal space.³⁵² Development assistance provides part of the answer, requiring an “increase – not a decline – of aid resources in the form of grants, concessional loans and debt relief.”³⁵³

POLITICAL INCLUSION

Supporting civil society and the media

Civil society organizations are critical to ensuring that the COVID-19 pandemic does not widen inequalities and leave millions further behind. As well as working nationally to monitor the effectiveness of health services and economic support packages, they have an important role globally in advocating for equitable vaccine distribution and in highlighting instances of waste or corruption with regard to debt relief and aid programs.

Civil society was often forced to cease working or move their activities online because of the pandemic. As early as May 2020, only 40 percent of 200 civil society organizations in a global survey said they were able to continue their core

activities.³⁵⁴ The pandemic may also have provided cover for new restrictions on civil society. According to the ICNL's COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker, 50 countries had implemented new measures that restricted freedom of expression by January 2020, and 130 had restricted freedom of assembly.³⁵⁵ Multinational technology companies have a part to play in ensuring online security and freedom for advocates,³⁵⁶ while international civil society coalitions such as CIVICUS have provided resources and other assistance to help their members adapt to the new working environment.³⁵⁷

The media, too, face new risks from the pandemic. Advertising and other revenues have fallen, with an estimated \$10 billion lost in sponsorship alone.³⁵⁸ Independent media organizations are most vulnerable, with a recent survey finding that 43% expect a significant decline in revenues due to the pandemic.³⁵⁹ Journalists have also been targeted by both governments and public when reporting on the pandemic or exposing corruption in emergency support packages.³⁶⁰

A number of foundations have increased their support for media companies during the pandemic,³⁶¹ while the Australian government has legislated to force Google and Facebook to pay for news.³⁶² There have been calls, too, for an international fund to support an independent media.³⁶³ If national and global media are to continue to play a part in promoting political inclusion via accurate information provision in an era of increasing government repression, they will need financial and political support from countries that continue to value media freedom.³⁶⁴

Tackling disinformation

In June 2020 the European Union released a joint communique warning of the “severe consequences” for the impact of the virus of false news and deliberate disinformation.³⁶⁵ “Disinformation in times of the coronavirus,” as EU High Representative Josep Borrell observed, “can kill.”

Disinformation is a transnational problem that demands transnational solutions. WHO has been working with social media and technology companies to ensure that accurate scientific information is transmitted on their platforms and inaccurate information removed.³⁶⁶ A report commissioned by UNESCO recommends that, “Intergovernmental organizations should provide technical assistance to Member States in order to develop regulatory frameworks and policies to address disinformation,” and that, “Internet companies should work together to deal with cross-platform disinformation; significantly improve their technological abilities to detect false and misleading content; and apply fact-checking to all political content published by politicians, political parties, their affiliates and other political actors.”³⁶⁷

COMBATING ABUSES

Tackling transnational corruption

The OECD has warned that the health and economic damage caused by the virus “can create environments that are ripe for corruption and bribery,” which risks hastening the decline in public trust in governments and state institutions.³⁶⁸ An analysis of government pandemic response plans, however, found that few pay attention to possible corruption related to healthcare and economic support programs.³⁶⁹ The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money laundering watchdog, has reported that the pandemic has both increased illicit financial flows from developing countries³⁷⁰ and made it more difficult for governments to stem them.³⁷¹

International action is critical to curbing corruption in the response to the pandemic. The OECD's Working Group on Bribery is providing support to governments to strengthen anti-bribery systems and tackle fraud related to economic recovery packages.³⁷² The Alliance for Anti-Corruption, Transparency and Accountability in Health (ACTA) is helping governments to incorporate anti-corruption measures into their efforts to tackle the health impacts of the virus.³⁷³ FATF is working with the IMF, World Bank and UN to assist countries to tackle money-laundering, online scams and illicit financial flows,³⁷⁴ and the Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity Panel has raised the possibility of creating a global asset registry to help expose and curb such flows.³⁷⁵

The Open Government Partnership provides a model for collective action between countries to transform how government serves its citizens.³⁷⁶ Its efforts to tackle corruption include a commitment by nearly 30 member countries to "advance global norms" on beneficial ownership transparency, and a commitment by 70 member countries to open contracting and transparency in public procurement. OGP is also developing policies to promote "transparency in the funding of campaigns, political parties, and democratic politics."

Institutionalizing anti-corruption measures over the longer term will be an important determinant of whether a stronger social contract can emerge from the crisis.

SUPPORTING GOVERNMENT DELIVERY

Global collective action can support national delivery by investing in the global public goods that help governments deliver their policy goals. It can help governments as they recover from the pandemic by building new partnerships and new financing models. And it can help them protect their societies against future shocks arising from environmental disasters, health crises, and conflict.

SUPPORTING RECOVERY

Global plans, shared responses

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of shared efforts to combat crises and renew development processes. Where national governments have blocked food supply chains or banned exports of personal protective equipment,³⁷⁷ or where they have hoarded vaccine supplies,³⁷⁸ the risks of exacerbating the crisis – via increased world hunger,³⁷⁹ for example, or an increased risk of vaccine-resistant mutations – have heightened.

The global public health system's response to the pandemic is an example of how new multilateral partnerships can strengthen national delivery of policy goals. The crisis has stimulated rapid governance innovation, with a proliferation of platforms and partnerships,³⁸⁰ unprecedented cross-border scientific cooperation,³⁸¹ and international support for supply chains that provide vulnerable countries with access to diagnostics, equipment, and treatments.³⁸²

The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator is a networked approach that is at the heart of the global response. The Accelerator was launched as a problem-solving platform which aimed by the end of 2021 to provide the world with 2 billion vaccine doses and to provide low- and middle-income countries with 245 million courses of treatment and 500 million diagnostic tests.³⁸³ This 'end-to-end global

solution' has an informal and networked structure, bringing together nine major partners on a temporary basis and with a plan to wind up after 18 months.³⁸⁴ Its four areas of focus are research and development; manufacturing of treatments, tests and vaccines; procurement and the supply chain; and delivery. By November 2020 it had raised \$38.1 billion, and still needed an additional \$28.5 billion³⁸⁵ (a total that amounts to less than 1 percent of what governments have already committed to economic recovery packages³⁸⁶). The success or otherwise of the program will provide a test case for the effectiveness of more networked institutional models.

As part of the ACT-Accelerator, the COVAX Facility provides the tools and delivery mechanisms for vaccine dissemination, working with developed and developing countries.³⁸⁷ COVAX has adopted an inclusive, partnership-based approach to delivering a public good. Convened by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, the Vaccine Alliance, and the WHO, it is a multi-stakeholder platform that includes governments, global health organizations, manufacturers, scientists, the private sector, and philanthropic organizations. Recent developments around COVID-19 vaccines offer an opportunity to scale health as a public good, to the benefit of developing and developed countries alike.³⁸⁸ Given the degree of competition around the vaccine, having a facility committed to providing equitable access is critical to scaling cooperation and to efforts to end the pandemic.

Beyond the public health arena, there are a number of emerging initiatives that assist national governments via international partnerships. Global industries such as shipping, whose work has been obstructed by national virus containment measures, have brought stakeholders together to develop safety protocols for preventing COVID-19 infections in vessels and ports, while the UN Global Compact published recommendations for keeping shipping supply chains moving during the pandemic.³⁸⁹ On trade, new agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the African Continental Free Trade Area promise to maintain open trading systems at regional levels.³⁹⁰ And with regard to food supplies, the FAO is helping cities around the world via its City Region Food System Toolkit, which provides guidance on building food systems that link cities with their surrounding regions.³⁹¹

Global challenges, global financing

Global governance and multilateral institutions have an important role to play in financing national recoveries from the pandemic. In September 2020, the IMF projected that global GDP would contract by 4.4 percent in 2020, with only a partial recovery expected for 2021 provided vaccines become available. In low-income countries, GDP was projected to shrink by more than 1 percent, having grown by 5.5 percent annually for the last 20 years. Ninety million people were projected to fall back into extreme poverty.

To support low-income countries to rebuild, the IMF has increased its lending capacity as well as its debt relief capabilities. The EU has pledged €183 million to the IMF's Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust, which provides debt service relief to countries experiencing catastrophes including pandemics, and the World Bank is expected to provide about \$160 billion in support by June 2021.³⁹² The 29 eligible member states of the trust had received \$500 million from the IMF by November 2020.

Further multilateral action on debt relief has come from the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative. Launched in April 2020, 46 countries had requested to

participate in the initiative by November, resulting in about \$5.7 billion in deferred payments. In addition, the G20 and the Paris Club agreed on a 'Common framework for debt treatment' beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative, which will enable further debt restructuring. Although it is not a member of the Paris Club, China agreed to the new G20 debt treatment principles.³⁹³

Going forward, there are calls to extend the G20 debt treatment framework to middle-income countries that have been heavily impacted by the pandemic, as well as a new general Special Drawing Rights allocation, an international money initiative issued by the IMF, to cope with the needs generated by the crisis.³⁹⁴ Given larger fears of COVID-19 leading to a global debt crisis, greater focus is being placed on how to make debt initiatives available not just to the least developed countries, but also to low- and middle-income countries.³⁹⁵

PROTECTING SOCIETIES AGAINST SHOCKS

Transnational risks

COVID-19 has shown that no country is immune to shocks that emanate from beyond its borders. These risks imperil all national development efforts, stifling governments' ability to deliver services in all areas. Protecting against such shocks in future will require international collaboration to build global resilience.

The World Economic Forum's 2020 Global Risks Perception Survey identified environmental risks along with digital inequality and cybersecurity as the highest-likelihood risks in the next decade. The highest-impact risks, on the other hand, are headed by infectious diseases.³⁹⁶ These threats risk slipping off policy-makers' agendas while the focus is on the coronavirus, and national resources for tackling them have dwindled as a result of the pandemic.³⁹⁷

As well as weaknesses in global systems, however, the coronavirus has also revealed how networked global responses can assist countries to address risks. The WHO's COVID-19 Partners Platform, launched in March 2019, has drawn on global expertise to inform national responses, particularly in countries with limited capacity.³⁹⁸ Partnerships established during the response to Ebola led to the WHO's Health Emergencies Programme³⁹⁹ and the formation of the Coalition on Epidemic Preparedness (CEPI).⁴⁰⁰ The pandemic is likely to have been still more devastating without such collaborations.

International action has also intensified in the struggle against antimicrobial resistance. WHO's Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS) "aggregates data from more than 64 000 surveillance sites with more than 2 million patients enrolled from 66 countries across the world."⁴⁰¹ The number of surveillance sites has increased from 729 in 2018. In July 2020, 23 leading pharmaceutical companies launched the \$1 billion AMR Action Fund to develop new antibiotics.⁴⁰² A month later, WHO, FAO and the World Organization for Animal Health launched the 'One Health' Global Leaders Group on Antimicrobial Resistance to "advocate for urgent action among heads of state, government ministers, private sector, and civil society."⁴⁰³ This work is a further example of multi-stakeholder and multi-country efforts that assist national governments to confront transnational threats.

International support to prevent and reduce violence worldwide

COVID-19 has exacerbated conflict dynamics, fueling existing grievances, increasing

inequality, significantly worsening gender-based violence globally, and challenging conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts by diverting resources.⁴⁰⁴

This highlights the need for all actors, including those at the global level, to maintain a focus on peacebuilding and conflict prevention in supporting national responses to COVID-19, and for local needs, political processes, and ongoing peace processes to be considered.⁴⁰⁵ “Support to governance,” the UN’s Governance for Peace report suggested, “is a worthy investment for sustaining peace and preventing future crises.”⁴⁰⁶

Countries’ resilience against conflict will be strengthened if their governance institutions are more inclusive, addressing rather than ignoring grievances and patterns of exclusion. As the Secretary-General has argued, “Guaranteeing equal opportunities, protection, access to resources and services and participation in decision-making are not simply moral and legal obligations. They are a necessary condition if countries are to truly break out of the conflict trap.”⁴⁰⁷

International action can support greater inclusiveness. The Peace in Our Cities campaign brings together 18 mayors and more than two dozen CSOs committed to halving urban violence by 2030, and engages more than 50 mayors who have signed up to join the Global Parliament of Mayors – Peace in Our Cities resolution to reduce urban violence.⁴⁰⁸ The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction supports governments to develop inclusive measures to reduce vulnerability to disasters and increase citizens’ ability to recover from them.⁴⁰⁹ The Open Government Partnership, whose membership comprises 78 national governments and thousands of CSOs, promotes accountability between governments and citizens by allowing the latter to monitor the implementation of government commitments.⁴¹⁰ Preventing conflict is “a bottom-up process that should involve as broad a spectrum of people and groups as possible,”⁴¹¹ and international collaboration can support governments by disseminating knowledge, demonstrating that reduction of all forms of violence is achievable, and encouraging greater commitment to social, economic and political inclusion.⁴¹²

SUMMARY

The Secretary-General has called for multilateralism to become more networked in the wake of the pandemic, implying a much closer working relationship between different parts of the international system. He also called for multilateralism to become more inclusive, “drawing on civil society, cities, businesses, local authorities and more and more on young people.”⁴¹³

As we look to the 2020s, we have an opportunity to try to ‘build back better’ after the pandemic. Governance is central to this process, both in our collective response to COVID-19 and in working towards the realization of the 2030 Agenda and reversing the losses of development gains made in recent years. As articulated by Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, Amina Mohammed, “Recovery from COVID-19 must prioritize resilient, inclusive and accountable institutions that foster the rule of law, good governance, gender equality, environmental sustainability and human rights.”⁴¹⁴

Collective action for improved governance offers the most sustainable approach to recovery and resilience, and to leaving no one behind.

CASE STUDIES

THE FOLLOWING CASE STUDIES HAVE BEEN KINDLY PROVIDED BY LEADING EXPERTS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR FIELD, AND PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE ACROSS A RANGE OF ISSUES THAT WERE EXACERBATED DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.

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EDTECH HUB

VICTORIA COLLIS, TOM KAYE, SUSAN NICOLAI & ABEBA TADDESE

By May 2020, over 1.5 billion learners were out of school, college, and university. Near universal closure of physical spaces presented a fundamental challenge to children's right to education.

Many looked to technology to solve this new education delivery challenge. Yet the evidence for what works in EdTech is not well developed, and the field is littered with unsuccessful interventions. There was a risk that applying technology to the problem of school closures would widen inequalities and deepen levels of learning poverty.

The EdTech Hub is a global research partnership that exists to strengthen and expand the evidence base for what works in technology for education.⁴¹⁵

Throughout 2020, the Hub synthesized evidence on topics ranging from the use of radio⁴¹⁶ and TV⁴¹⁷ to the role of EdTech in catch-up learning programs.⁴¹⁸ It helped scale up projects using EdTech to address special needs⁴¹⁹ and refugee education⁴²⁰ and advised governments on the use of technology for issues ranging from teacher professional development⁴²¹ to the collection and use of school system data.⁴²²

The emphasis has been on supporting transparent and accountable decision making, based on evidence, which protects and advances *all* children's right to learn. Three of the most important lessons the Hub has learned about how EdTech can contribute to stronger governance in the sector are:

- 1. Use EdTech to strengthen collection and analysis of education data.** Better data gives decision makers the tools to plan and budget more effectively and transparently. In Bangladesh, the Hub provided guidance on how to shape monitoring of uptake of its multimodal distance learning program, enabling officials to plan lower-tech solutions where students need them.⁴²³
- 2. Ensure EdTech is supporting, not seeking to replace, teachers.** Teachers are by far the biggest recurrent investment made in any education system. For learners to thrive when studying remotely, they need teaching presence. This means teachers too need support through professional development, as well as access to open resources such as lesson plans. In Ethiopia, the Hub developed a briefing for government officials on effective teacher education in low and middle-income countries,⁴²⁴ including the role of EdTech in delivery as well as the importance of providing a coherent policy environment where educators do not find themselves at odds with what principals, parents, or the state expect from education.
- 3. Ensure EdTech is appropriate to local operating contexts.** The most effective interventions address local challenges in a more cost or time-effective way than non-digital solutions. In Zanzibar, the government was thinking of designing a virtual learning environment to distribute content to learners at home. Working through a feasibility assessment with the EdTech Hub helped the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training to revise its response.⁴²⁵ Officials decided to prioritize sourcing and curating a suite of existing open educational resources, and making them available through multiple modes, including phones and TV, as well as online.

CITY MOBILIZATION TO PREVENT AND REDUCE VIOLENCE

ROBERT MUGGAH, IGARAPE INSTITUTE

All cities are affected by multiple types of violence. Every year, over 600,000 people die violently as a result of conflict, crime, extremism, or intimate-partner and domestic abuse. Hundreds of millions of people are afraid to walk alone at night for fear of being victimized. During the COVID-19 pandemic, reported domestic abuse and sexual violence increased sharply in many parts of the world.

A growing number of city leaders and civic entrepreneurs are exploring practical ways to prevent and reduce the risks of violence on the street and in the home in ways that do not involve excessive deployment of police or other heavy-handed measures. The combination of smart leadership, data-driven and evidence-based interventions focused on hot spots, and social and economic prevention measures have generated positive returns.

However, there has been limited inter-city action to accelerate violence reduction measures around the world. The Global Parliament of Mayors is one of a modest number of global city networks focused on, among other things, preventing and reducing urban violence.⁴²⁶ The Parliament does this by shaping global debate on the issue, including working in partnership with international institutions such as UN-Habitat. The Parliament also promotes information sharing and best practices in concert with other city networks such as the European Forum for Urban Security, Peace in Our Cities, the African Forum for Urban Security, and the Strong Cities Network. In 2019, it launched the Durban Declaration which explicitly underlined its commitment to reducing violence by 50 percent in cities by 2030.⁴²⁷ Through its membership of over 50 mayors, the Parliament is also advancing a set of evidence-based practices to drive positive transformation from the ground up.

Beyond the Parliament, there is growing support for improving safety and security in cities. Almost 60 city councils signed off on the 2020 violence reduction commitments. They were joined by six city networks representing over 1,500 metropolitan areas globally.⁴²⁸ City leaders from Bristol to Los Angeles and from Haifa to Cape Town committed to progressive resolutions to cut violence in half over the coming decade.

The city-led resolution to halve violence provides political cover for city leaders to commit to significantly reducing all forms of lethal violence in cities, invest in evidence-based solutions, work in partnership with national and international organizations, focus on the most vulnerable communities, empower survivors and young people, break intergenerational cycles of violence, and tackle digital extremism. The resolution was delivered to the UN Secretary General in November 2020⁴²⁹ and will be used to leverage further city engagement at an upcoming Global Parliament of Mayors summit in 2021.

SDG FORUM KENYA

FLORENCE SYEVUO AND ROSE K OLUOCH

The SDG Kenya Forum offers a platform for citizens and public and private organizations in all sectors to engage with each other to implement, monitor, and report on the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda.⁴³⁰ When COVID-19 was discovered in Kenya, the Forum conducted a CSO mapping exercise⁴³¹ to identify initiatives by its members and set up a web page to update members on initiatives moving forward.⁴³²

One of the SDG Kenya Forum's partners, Amref Health Africa, in partnership with Kenya Breweries Limited and the Kenya Red Cross Society, complemented the work of the Ministry of Health in Kenya by supplying sanitizers to vulnerable Kenyans in the informal settlements of Kibera, Kawangware and Mathare, and by training community health workers to identify, isolate and refer suspected cases and to maintain safety standards at points of entry or high-risk areas to prevent possible transmission. In addition, members of the SDG Kenya Forum, mainly CSOs, have provided personal protective equipment such as face masks, soap, medical supplies, sanitizers, and food and water rations during national lockdowns, especially targeting people in informal settlements.

Kenya, like many other countries, has had to tackle deep underlying challenges related to inequalities and under-development in critical sectors including access to health systems and gross corruption that have undermined the national response to the virus. To redress these deficits, SDG Kenya Forum members have contributed to policy frameworks such as the proposed Public Health Rules 2020 (Prevention, Control and Suppression of COVID-19), and have provided critical views focusing on the needs of the most vulnerable that have been shared with the National Emergency Response Committee on COVID-19.

HOW THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IS SUPPORTING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO MITIGATE THE IMPACTS OF COVID AND ENSURE AN INCLUSIVE RECOVERY⁴³³

ANN-SOFIE JESPERSEN, ROSEMARY ROP, AND FLORENCIA GUERZOVICH

Collaborative social accountability offers a framework to enable an ‘all-hands-on-deck’ approach to this multisectoral crisis, as it engages citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs), and public sector institutions in joint, iterative problem solving to improve accountability, service delivery, and sector governance.⁴³⁴

The Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA), a Trust Fund of the World Bank Group based in the Social Sustainability and Inclusion Global Practice, seeks to support CSOs in their response to COVID-19, blending flexible funding for civil society-led coalitions to work with governments to solve problems prioritized by local actors. The GPSA provides support to CSOs in implementation, capacity strengthening, and coalition-building.

CSOs continue to play the role of information mediator, countering disinformation and channeling citizen feedback to and from decision makers. *Send-Ghana*, a former GPSA grantee, has helped hundreds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across the country to monitor the government’s pandemic-related interventions and provide real-time feedback, and will start monitoring how the government uses funds allocated for the COVID-19 response.⁴³⁵ For the Dominican Republic’s “*My Community Participates in How My School Goes*” program, the GPSA is supporting its CSO partner, World Vision, to design a mobile phone-enabled online survey distributed via WhatsApp. Data is gathered and channeled through a network of directors, education centers, and parents, to monitor the distribution of hygiene kits by the Ministry, as well as the efficiency and accessibility of online distance learning tools.⁴³⁶

Further, and with the high rate and volume of financial flow in response to COVID-19, CSOs can also perform fiduciary oversight and accountability, for example through participatory third-party monitoring. In Paraguay, the Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo (CIRD) manages a web platform dedicated to providing public information about donations received from the public sector, public procurement made with these funds, and their distribution. CIRD also facilitates virtual feedback to gather citizens’ and CSOs’ opinions on targeting. An online COVID module investment map then tracks the government’s public budget expenditures in a user-friendly format, including spending on programs, contracts, and subsidies.

In previous pandemics, social capital (trust, knowledge, information sharing, and participation in voluntary organizations) carried over to facilitate other government activities,⁴³⁷ including improved health governance and service delivery.⁴³⁸ Collective action, therefore, such as social accountability that meaningfully engages civil society across the policy cycle, is part of building back better.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE IN PROVIDING EFFECTIVE AND TRANSPARENT OVERSIGHT OF THE COVID-19 RESPONSE

US GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

For 100 years, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has made the United States government work better for American citizens. GAO is an independent, non-partisan legislative branch agency that also serves as the U.S. Supreme Audit Institution. GAO examines federal expenditures and programs to help the government save money and work more effectively. For example, GAO identified about \$77.6 billion in financial benefits in fiscal year 2020 – a return of about \$114 for every \$1 in its budget. GAO also identified 1,332 other benefits that led to program and operational improvements across the government, as well as enhancements in public health and safety.

Most recently, GAO is providing strong, effective, and transparent oversight of the largest response to a national emergency in US history and making recommendations for improvement. Following the passage of the CARES Act in March 2020, GAO began assessing its implementation and issuing bi-monthly reports and monthly briefings to Congressional committees. All of GAO's relevant work is on its public website.⁴³⁹

Consistent with the seven core principles of SDG16 that focus on strong institutions – access to information, accountability, anti-corruption, effectiveness, inclusiveness, non-discrimination, and transparency – GAO's work and recommendations focus on actions the government should take to enhance the effectiveness of its COVID-19 response.

This includes recommendations for Congressional consideration related to testing guidelines, first responders, nursing homes and facilities for veterans, vaccine development and distribution, federal agency coordination, supply chains, unemployment, improper payments, tax considerations, and societal impacts associated with age, race, and ethnicity.

GAO has also actively engaged with the international audit and donor communities to share relevant and timely resources with members of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). Specifically, as the pandemic unfolded, GAO recognized that national audit offices should play a key role in monitoring the pandemic response. At the same time, many faced challenges with continuity of operations and access to appropriate audit methodologies.

As a result, GAO led an INTOSAI COVID-19 effort to assist our counterparts around the world. This initiative included:

- Mobilizing financial assistance from INTOSAI to help audit offices acquire information technology and software to facilitate remote work.
- Sharing audit methodologies, best practices, training resources, and the results of relevant audits from INTOSAI members.
- Developing a lessons learned document focused on planning for and mitigating similar events in the future based on dialogue among relevant stakeholders including the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies, OECD, regional health organizations, the donor community, and non-governmental organizations.

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